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“To wish was to hope, and to hope was to expect” 





“The fruit of empty hopes is more bitter than the saddest truth.” 
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 On Thursday, January 21, 1943, students, faculty, family, and community members 
gathered in the University of Chicago’s Bond Chapel for Samuel Northrup Harper’s funeral. 
Three days before, Harper, one of the United States’s most authoritative and respected Russian 
experts, had died of a cerebral hemorrhage in his Woodlawn Avenue home in Chicago.3  
 Born in Morgan Park, Chicago, on April 9, 1882, Harper was the son of William Rainey 
Harper, a founder of the University of Chicago and its first president. After finishing high school, 
Harper enrolled at the university and completed his bachelor’s degree in 1902. That fall, his 
father, who had visited Russia a number of times to recruit lecturers to speak at the University of 
Chicago, decided that young Samuel should study French and Russian at l’Ecole des Langues 
Orientales Vivantes in Paris, since possibilities for learning the latter in the United States were 
virtually nonexistent at the time. Obeying his father’s wishes, Harper went to Paris and worked 
diligently to learn Russian, a language that, in the western imagination, was considered 
“oriental” and, therefore, dissimilar to western European tongues.4  
 After studying French and Russian for two years, he moved to Russia to enroll as a non- 
degree student at Moscow University. Here, Harper encountered Russians of various political 
positions and, soon, moved into an apartment with several radical Russian students from the 
university. His first exposure to Russian socialism, Harper recalled, took place when his 
roommates chastised him for having “incorrect” views on Russian politics. While walking to the 
American Embassy in St. Petersburg on January 22, 1905, to meet members of a visiting 
American delegation, Harper noticed a gathering of workers converging on the tsar’s Winter 
                                                        
3 “Samuel Harper, U. of C. Expert on Russia, Dies,” Chicago Tribune, January 19, 1943, 12.  
4 Paul A. Goble “Samuel N. Harper and the Study of Russia: His Career and Collection,” Cahiers du 
monde russe et soviétique 14 (4) (October-December 1973): 608-10. 
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Palace, and stopped to observe. Soon, he heard shots being fired and saw several workers fall to 
the ground. Moving in closer to observe the incident, Harper found himself surrounded by 
protestors and a policeman chased him out of Palace Square. Afterward, he ran to the U.S. 
Embassy and informed the ambassador of what had just taken place.5 Little did he know at the 
moment that he had witnessed the opening shots of the Revolution of 1905, which forced the tsar 
to concede a legislative body, the Duma. Harper had already experienced a key event in 
revolutionary Russia’s transformation, but the Revolution of 1905 would be only the first of 
many such happenings that he would attempt to understand.   
 After a brief respite in Chicago in 1906, he returned to Russia to observe the Duma in 
action and became close friends with many of its members, including Pavel (Paul) Miliukov, the 
leader of the Constitutional Democratic party who Harper’s father had invited to lecture at the 
University of Chicago in 1903.6 This period of observation led him to write a book on the Duma 
and began months of extensive fieldwork on local government in Russia that culminated in a 
handful of articles dealing with Russian political institutions, and a textbook for intermediate 
Russian-language students.7 During 1908-9, Harper received a faculty fellowship at Columbia 
University, where he taught Russian history and studied political science, a skill that he hoped 
                                                        
5 Ibid, 610. 
6 Goble, “Samuel N. Harper and the Study of Russia,” 609. 
7 For Harper’s book on the Duma, see The New Electoral Law for the Russian Duma (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1908). For Harper’s description of his life and work on Russia before 1916, including 
his fieldwork, see The Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper, 1902-1941 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1945), 1-80. Harper’s major scholarly works prior to 1916 include a widely 
used adaptation and English translation of a textbook for intermediate students of Russian, Russian 
Reader: Accented Texts, Grammatical and Explanatory Notes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1908); “The Budget Rights of the Russian Duma,” Journal of Political Economy 16 (3) (March 1908): 
152-56; and “Exceptional Measures in Russia,” Russian Review 1 (1912): 92-105. For the most complete 
list of Harper’s scholarly works and writings to date, see Ronald Thompson’s unpublished 1944 
bibliography “Harper on Russia: The Writings of Samuel N. Harper, University of Chicago (1882-1943)” 
available in Box 59, Folder 6, Samuel N. Harper Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University 
of Chicago. Though the bibliography is lengthy, archivists at the University of Chicago’s Special 
Collections archive claim that it is not complete. 
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would make him more marketable when seeking future academic positions.8 Gaining respect for 
his knowledge of Russia, Harper took a job in England at the University of Liverpool’s Russian 
studies department, where he taught from 1911 to 1913 and served as a founding editorial board 
member of the Russian Review, first published in 1911.9 Harper now had teaching experience on 
his résumé, a fact that allowed him to return to the University of Chicago in 1914 as an assistant 
professor of Russian language and institutions. He taught there until his death in 1943.  
Soon after Harper assumed this post, Russia underwent myriad political, social, and 
economic transformations brought about by the Russian Revolution, an event that historian 
Alexander Rabinowitch calls the most important of the twentieth century.10 Locked in World 
War I, Americans anxiously observed Russia, but knew remarkably little about the country and 
the revolution it was experiencing. 
And in stepped Harper, who simultaneously morphed into what observers at the time 
called the United States’s “foremost authority on Russia.”11 Widely respected as informed and 
authoritative, Harper and his take on Russian politics carried much weight and, thus, he 
commented profusely on Russian events. In addition to teaching classes at the University of 
Chicago, he maintained an active lecture circuit in which he spoke on Russia to a wide array of 
organizations, including small-town dinner clubs, churches, business organizations, high schools, 
colleges and universities, public audiences in downtown Chicago, and academic conferences. 
Moreover, he regularly wrote newspaper articles in which he deciphered Russian political events 
                                                        
8 Harper, The Russia I Believe In, 61. 
9 Harper wrote that the journal was designed primarily for “government officers, members of [British] 
Parliament, universities, libraries, and editors of leading periodicals.” For Harper’s description of his 
duties associated with the Russian Review, see The Russian I Believe In, 74-75.  
10 Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power: The First Year of Bolshevik Rule in Petrograd 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), ix. 
11 “Harper Will Tell of the New Russia: Expert to Speak to National Geographic Society Here Friday,” 
Washington Post, March 27, 1917, 14.  
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for readers. Finally, Harper served a stint as an assistant in the U.S. Department of State’s 
Russian Bureau from 1919 until 1921, making him one of remarkably few American specialists 
on Russia to inform the United States government on politics in the country, a trend that would 
continue for over two decades.12 In short, nearly any American who followed Russian 
developments between World War I and World War II probably would have been acquainted 
with Harper’s name and opinion, since his voice resonated through numerous strata of American 
society. 
 In this thesis, I zoom in on Harper and his understanding of Russian politics between 
1916 and 1921, six years of dramatic transformation in Russia and in Harper’s views on it. In 
1916, Russia was a member of the Allies in WWI and trade between it and the United States 
nearly tripled from its 1915 levels.13 In February 1917, Petrograd bread riots instigated by angry, 
hungry women led to the overthrow of the tsar, whom a Duma Committee quickly replaced with 
a Provisional Government. A second revolution that October overthrew the Provisional 
Government and brought the Bolsheviks, a radical Marxist party, to power. “The Bolsheviki,” as 
Harper referred to them, withdrew Russia from WWI and embraced an unprecedented political 
course for the country that called for international socialist revolution, denounced capitalism, and 
held workers and working class values supreme. How did Harper react to these events? Given 
that his voice carried intellectual clout and engaged a wide audience, how did Harper depict 
Russia’s rapid political transformation to Americans? How and in which ways did his views set 
                                                        
12 David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 1. Engerman notes that in 1946, the beginning of the Cold War, the 
United States government employed only about two dozen Soviet experts. By 1948, this number had 
grown to thirty-eight.  
13 American exports to Russia increased from $169,993,904 in 1915 to $470,508,254 in 1916. See chapter 
1 and appendix B.  
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the tone for subsequent interactions between Russia and the United States? These questions hold 
central importance in this study. 
 At the time of his death, every obituary stressed Harper’s substantial and defining 
contribution to American understandings of Russia. A writer for the Chicago Tribune 
unequivocally stated that “in the last quarter century he achieved prominence as one of the 
foremost American authorities on the life and language of the soviet people.”14 The New York 
Times explained that Harper had spend over a quarter century studying Russian history and 
politics and, in doing so, made a major contribution to American perceptions of the country.15 
Bernard Pares, a British colleague and the founder of Russian studies in Great Britain, praised 
Harper’s work and wrote that American knowledge of Russia was far larger because of him.16 
Walter Lichtenstein, one of Harper’s close friends and a professor at Northwestern University, 
praised Harper’s expertise and regretted that his “thorough knowledge of Russian affairs” had 
died with him. Harper’s death represented a “notable loss to American scholars,” he noted.17 
 Yet historians studying American perceptions of revolutionary Russia today would hardly 
come away with this impression, primarily because almost all of the relevant historiography has 
treated Harper as little more than a peripheral figure in forming them. Many works depict his as 
merely another voice among the cacophony of opinions circulating during the period, despite the 
central importance that contemporaries assigned to his views.18 Notably, a recent book dealing 
                                                        
14 “Samuel Harper, U. of C. Expert on Russia, Dies,” Chicago Tribune, January 19, 1943, 12. 
15 “Prof. S.N. Harper of Chicago U. Dies,” New York Times, January 19, 1943, 19.  
16 Bernard Pares, “Professor Samuel Northrup Harper,” The Slavonic and East European Review, 
American Series 2 (1) (1943): 289-92.  
17 Walter Lichtenstein, “Samuel Northrup Harper,” The American Political Science Review 37 (2) (April 
1943): 324-25.  
18 For works that treat Harper in this way, see Clarence Manning, A History of Slavic Studies in the United 
States (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957); Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet 
Experiment, 1917-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); George T. Blakey, Historians on 
the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
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with western visitors to Russia and the Soviet Union in the two decades preceding WWII 
provides no mention of Harper.19  
Indeed, only one study, a 1974 dissertation by John Charles Chalberg, focuses solely on 
Harper.20 Chalberg’s unpublished work, an intellectual history, examines the development of 
Harper’s thinking and places his shifting outlook between 1905 and 1943 in the context of other 
elites who simultaneously attempted to understand political change in Russia.21 Yet Chalberg 
gives almost no attention to how Harper’s biases shaped American public opinion of Russia. By 
selecting Harper’s intellectual evolution as his sole object of study, Chalberg missed a valuable 
opportunity to comment on the extent to which Harper’s views set the tone for subsequent–Cold 
War–popular opinion on Russia. Other studies have followed a similar trend. Many concentrate 
on “high politics” and their role in American reactions to the Russian Revolution, highlighting 
figures such as Woodrow Wilson and his administration.22 Still others underscore the crucial role 
that philosophical trends common among intellectuals in the early twentieth century played in 
their depictions of revolutionary Russia.23 Even Christopher Lasch’s well-known 1962 book The 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1970); Robert F. Byrnes, A History of Russian and East European Studies in the United States: Selected 
Essays (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994); David S. Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against 
Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995); Norman Saul, War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1917-1921 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001); David C. Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: 
American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2003); Ibid, Know Your Enemy. 
19 See Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors 
to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
20 Two articles have also dealt with Harper, but both focus almost exclusively on his biography and the 
contents of his archive, instead of analyzing him as an influential public figure. See Goble, “Samuel N. 
Harper and the Study of Russia,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 14 (4) (October-December 1973): 
608-20; and John B. Poster, “A Warmth of Soul: Samuel Northrup Harper and the Russians, 1904-43,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 14 (2) (1979): 235-51. 
21 John Charles Chalberg, “Samuel Harper and Russia Under the Tsars and Soviets, 1905-1943,” PhD 
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1974. 
22 See, for example, Donald E. David and Eugene P. Trani, The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow 
Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002).  
23 See Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore   
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American Liberals and the Russian Revolution, a “study of ideas more than men and 
movements,” explains only the event’s divisive effect on liberals in the United States, not its 
implications for public opinion. As a result, we know little about how influential narratives of the 
Russian Revolution shaped American public discourse on Russia. 
Fortunately, Harper left behind voluminous materials that speak to the intimate details of 
his perception of Russian development and his life. His four decades-long opus of letters, 
reports, lectures, newspaper clippings, photographs, and other materials are today housed in the 
University of Chicago’s Special Collections archive. At the time of his death, Harper was writing 
his memoirs, but died before he finished. Published posthumously by his brother in 1945 just as 
the Cold War began, The Russia I Believe In gives an account of Harper’s experience and 
addresses his evolving perception of Russia. I draw heavily from both of these sources, 
particularly the Harper archive. However, unlike the handful of other studies that analyze or 
mention Harper, I emphasize his comments in public venues, including speeches to civil 
organizations and, in particular, newspaper articles. I do so in order to trace Harper’s voice as it 
radiated outward to the American public, not merely as it developed internally. 
I intervene on three levels. First, I add to knowledge on Samuel Harper, a figure whose 
importance in shaping American understandings of revolutionary Russia has been woefully 
understudied. This thesis, however, is more than an intellectual biography of one man since it 
uses Harper as a prism through which to examine the origins of American popular opinion 
toward Soviet Russia. Second, I identify and historicize Harper’s subjectivities and place them in 
conversation with members of the public and public opinion, treating them as shapers of 
widespread views of Russia, not mere intellectual musings. Here, I portray Harper as an 
influential filter through which facts on Russian politics often passed before reaching the 
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American populace. Doing so illuminates the highly politicized sieve through which the public 
received information about Russia. Finally, I seek to fill a gap in scholarly understanding on the 
“Russian Revolution’s impact on world history,” or how revolutionary Russia’s political 
evolution affected communities beyond it borders, a hole in the literature that historian Donald J. 
Raleigh has recently pointed out.24 To do so, I address the channels through which Harper 
received his information about Russia and conclude by suggesting the profound implications for 
international relations and the Cold War that Harper’s interpretation would have over the 
proceeding decades. 
I argue that, between 1916 and 1921, Harper’s authoritative and influential understanding 
of Russian politics, and the ways in which he promulgated it to the American public, constructed 
a binary both in his own mind and in popular opinion that pitted Soviet Russia and the United 
States against one another. Imagining Russia’s political evolution in terms of his own ideological 
biases and encouraging the American public to do the same, Harper created a set of political and 
economic expectations for Russia that, ultimately, it never achieved. In chapter 1, I focus on 
Harper and the American public in 1916, the final months of Tsar Nicholas II’s reign, and reveal 
an ongoing dialog between Harper and the American business community that fostered a positive 
and hopeful, yet false, set of political and economic expectations for Russia by touting emerging 
business opportunities in the country. In chapter 2, I examine Harper and his take on Russia 
throughout 1917, a year that brought two revolutions to the country, and trace the rise and fall of 
his optimism on Russia’s political future by analyzing the copious statements he made about the 
country’s situation to a wide swath of the public. Here, I argue that he judged the events of that 
year against an unrealistic, liberally oriented metric and show that doing so caused him to draw a 
                                                        
24 Donald J. Raleigh, “The Russian Revolution after All These 100 Years,” Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 16 (4) (2015): 791-92. 
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clear line between the February and October Revolutions, praising the former and condemning 
the latter. Finally, in chapter 3, I scrutinize and historicize Harper’s take on the first four years of 
Bolshevik power and the Russian civil war and show how he promoted a view of Bolshevism as 
the polar opposite of American democracy and capitalism. By tracing his often vehement efforts 
to urge Americans to adopt this opinion, I show the implications of the chasm between Harper’s 
expectations for Russia and the on-the-ground reality of Bolshevik power, especially in terms of 
American recognition of the Soviet Union, and an overall negative relationship with socialism 
and Bolshevism. 
In short, this thesis represents a study of a man whose historically and politically 
particular subjectivities set the tone for American views of Russia for decades to come. One’s 
individual subjectivity and biases play a pivotal role in defining a person and his or her 
worldview. Harper’s found their way into most corners of America and, thus, played an essential 














“There is plenty of room in Russia:” Harper and the American Public on the 
Eve of Russia’s Year of Revolution 
 
In a lecture on late tsarist Russia’s economy that he gave to his University of Chicago 
Russian history class, Samuel Harper analyzed the longue durèe of the country’s economic 
development, underscoring the importance of its upsurge after the Revolution of 1905. “It was 
during the last decade–since 1905–that the economic development of [Russia] was progressing 
very rapidly – bringing better conditions to many,” he told his students.25 Given his role in 
interpreting Russia for Americans during the period about which he spoke, Harper played a 
major part in shaping the country’s understanding of Russian economic and political 
developments during the last year preceding the February Revolution of 1917. 
 In this chapter I use the period from January 1916 to February 1917, the final thirteen 
months of Nicholas II’s rule, as a prism through which I examine the American public and 
Harper’s perception of emerging opportunities for American trade, sales, and investment in 
Russia. During this year, elements of the American business class looked forward to when their 
companies could profit from economic interaction with Russia after WWI. Widely hailed as the 
country’s foremost expert on all things Russian, Harper used the respect he commanded to 
convince those interested in doing business in Russia that the country moved steadily toward an 
economic and political system that would welcome them doing so. I argue that by presenting the 
business community and the American public with his authoritative, yet subjective, 
understanding of Russia, Harper helped construct and further entrench a set of economic and 
political expectations for Russia that situated the country on a rapidly developing path toward a 
liberal economic system that both welcomed American trade and provided vast, untapped 
                                                        
25 Lecture Notes, Box 32, Folder 46, Harper Papers.  
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markets for American goods. This view, and its implicit assumptions about the liberal nature of 
Russia’s political development, would color Harper’s and American’s ways of understanding 
Russia during its year of revolution, the first years of Bolshevik rule, and for decades beyond.  
 
The American Press Reports Economic Opportunity in Russia 
 In 1916 and early 1917 war raged in Europe. Even though America had not officially 
sided with the Allies, the war impacted its economy, the world’s largest at the time. Immersed in 
conflict, European nations, divided between the Allies and Central powers, retreated from what 
political economist Jeffrey A. Frieden calls the “world economy” and placed most of their 
economic effort into war production. The result, a financial vacuum, left America, a wealthy 
nation that had historically been little engaged in large-scale international trade, to be one of the 
world’s foremost providers of capital, markets, and technology. Between late 1914 and early 
1917, American exports more than doubled and the country’s trade surplus grew to five times 
larger than before WWI.26 For America, 1916 was a time of great economic growth, particularly 
in international trade. 
 News of economic opportunities in Russia, a member of the Allied powers, found its way 
into the headlines of both major and minor American newspapers. A vast country, Russia 
attracted attention because of its large, underutilized markets and abundant natural resources. For 
example, a survey of articles in the Wall Street Journal, the publication of the American business 
community, and other American newspapers, both local and national and not intended 
exclusively for the business community, reveals that, on the eve of the February Revolution, the 
American press buzzed with stories of Russian economic development and the exciting 
                                                        
26 Jeffrey A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2006), 130-31.  
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opportunities that awaited American businessmen who were savvy enough to claim a stake in the 
emerging market.27  
One such article excitedly noted that Russia was “the largest single buying population in 
the world–equal to that of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary combined.” Its 
author stressed that “the tremendously increasing purchasing power of the huge population” 
would ensure that Russia needed “an increasing amount of manufactured goods” since it could 
not “supply itself, from its home industries.”28 The front page of the Wall Street Journal 
announced that the Russian government placed an order from American manufacturing firms for 
10,000 railroad cars, which employees of the Pressed Steel Car Company, a Pittsburgh firm, 
sailed to the eastern Russian port of Vladivostok to fill. The piece noted that “Russia is 
understood to be very well satisfied with the work done by the company. The salesman having 
made good on the initial order is certain to have a good chance of taking repeated orders.”29  
 Word of economic opportunity in Russia also found its way into a wide geographic array 
of local newspapers and gave the same message to small business owners and farmers that it did 
to Wall Street executives. For example, an article in the Grand Forks Herald of Grand Forks, 
North Dakota, exclaimed that “more and more American businessmen appear to be investigating 
commercial possibilities in Russia.” These businessmen were beginning to blaze a path between 
                                                        
27 For a small sampling of the many articles describing American economic opportunities related to 
Russia, see the Wall Street Journal, “Russia’s Opportunity After the Conflict,” March 15, 1916, 8; “West 
Sees a Good Market in Russia,” March 24, 1916, 7; “Russia Inquiring for 1,000 Large Locomotives,” 
June 3, 1916, 7; “Investment in Russia,” June 16, 1916, 1; “Russia Increasing Its Inquiries for Cars,” June 
13, 1916, 1; “Russia Wonderfully Awakened by the War,” July 20, 1916, 7; “Machinery for Russia,” July 
29, 1916, 5; “McRoberts Impressed with Russia’s Vast Resources,” August 1, 1916, 1; “Russia in Market 
With Big Copper Order,” September 7, 1916, 1; “Russia in Market for 5,000 Tons of Copper,” September 
8, 1916, 7; “Leather Sale to Russia for $8,500,000,” October 25, 1916, 2; “Russia Will Buy More Engines 
Here,” December 4, 1916, 1; “Russia Presses Work on Grain Elevator System,” January 13, 1917, 5; 
“Russia’s Resources Great,” January 17, 1917, 7.  
28 “America’s Tremendous Opportunity in Russia,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1916, 3.  
29 “Russia Wants 10,000 86-100 Pound Box Cars,” Wall Street Journal, January 26, 1916, 1. 
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their country and Russia, since Americans were “continually streaming in from Petrograd and 
Moscow with their pockets filled with contracts or the proceeds of sales.” Opportunities for 
businessmen were already beginning to blossom in Russia; even more, “all American business-
men returning from that country” were “enthusiastic over the possibilities there.”30 Opportunity 
aplenty existed for the foreseeable future claimed the local press, which underscored stories of 
Americans returning from Russia with tales of the marvelous expansion of the country’s 
economic capacity.  
 Much of this discourse, on both the national and local levels, argued that if Americans 
invested and sold in Russia, the transaction would be mutually beneficial. Americans could meet 
war-torn Russia’s “abnormal demands” for “tools, hardware, machinery, agricultural 
implements, etc.” by selling their goods in the country. In doing so, American men of business 
would not only reap handsome profits, but would find their Russian counterparts to be “friendly 
towards [Americans], kind hearted and generally fair and honorable in their business dealings.”31  
Americans would thus help the Russians industrialize their country, while profiting from doing 
so.  
 
The Business Community Responds 
                                                        
30 “Chances for U.S. Business: Russia Should Offer Immense Opportunity After the War,” Grand Forks 
Herald, January 1, 1917, 6. For other examples of similar articles appearing in local newspapers, see 
“Nicholas Riabouchinsky,” The Idaho Recorder, February 4, 1916, 4; El Paso Herald, April 15, 1916, 18; 
The Garden Island, April 18, 1916, 8; “Russian Orders for U.S. Autos Total in Millions,” Aberdeen 
Herald, September 8, 1916, 4; “Russia Richer in Spite of War, Will Offer Great Market to United States,” 
Mexico Missouri Message, September 14, 1916, 3; “Increased Freight Business,” The Daily Ardmoreite, 
October 13, 1916, 3; “Coming Russia,” Nashville Tennessean and the Nashville American, December 3, 
1916, B8; “American Business Man in Russia,” Webster City Freeman, December 19, 1916, 2; Ocala 
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 In response to this news, intellectuals and business leaders with technical knowledge of 
the Russian economy called attention to the difficulty of doing business with the country by 
highlighting potential problems with tasks, such as “obtaining credit ratings from individual 
[Russian] firms” or being able to communicate effectively and efficiently with Russian 
businessmen.32 To remedy these issues, they called for and formed various bureaus and 
organizations aimed at facilitating trade between the United States and Russia and giving 
American business professionals tools to market their products or invest in Russia. Nicholas 
Goldweiser, a professor at the University of Wisconsin and an advocate of increased trade 
between the two countries, emphasized the importance of the “importation into Russia of 
American manufactured goods, American technical skill and American enterprise.” Goldweiser 
urged the creation of a bureau responsible for promoting this exchange and a department that 
would deal with legal issues arising when businessmen performed transactions in or with the 
Russian empire.33  
The business community understood the necessity of these institutions and responded 
with practical tools and advice that would ease American business’s entrance into the Russian 
market. Consider, for instance, the Guaranty Trust Company, a New York banking and trust 
service, which advertised that “the volume of export business from the United States to Russia” 
was “arousing among our bankers and manufacturers a spirit of very thoughtful interest as to the 
possibility of maintaining these relations.” To aid this interest, the company offered a manual 
that contained “information concerning the Russian empire, its finances, agriculture, industries 
and commerce, with particular reference to the progress made by the Russian people during the 
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[preceding] decade.”34 The company assembled the manual with the explicit goal of giving 
businessmen an easily readable set of instructions on how to negotiate with Russian businessmen 
as well as a general overview of the types of products that Russians would be most likely to 
demand.  
 In January 1916, leaders of major American corporations including U.S. Steel, 
Westinghouse, International Harvester, and Chase National Bank formed the American-Russian 
Chamber of Commerce, which opened its first branch in New York City under the leadership of 
Charles Boynton and E. Chapell Porter. This institution dedicated itself to fostering “a closer 
union in industry” between Russia and the United States and to creating “bonds of mutual 
sympathy and friendship between the two great nations.”35 To do so, its founders lobbied the 
American and Russian governments to lift trade restrictions.36 Porter traveled to Russia on the 
organization’s behalf to gather information on Russian industry.37 Moreover, the Chamber 
provided services to American businessmen including a translation department, expositions on 
economic possibilities for Americans in Russia, and even a handbook for Russian businessmen 
explaining the structure of America’s industrial sector.38 Much like the Guaranty Trust manual, it 
explained that “Russia will make large purchases of goods in this country,” while noting that the 
country had “enormous undeveloped resources” that would aid in its economic transformation in 
the coming years.39 
                                                        
34 “American Opportunities in Russia,” Baltimore Sun, June 28, 1916, 13.  
35 Bulletin of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, 1916, Box 3, Folder 4, Harper Papers. 
36 Norman Saul, War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1917-1921 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2001), 16. 
37 Porter to Harper, January 13, 1917, Box 3, Folder 10, Harper Papers; “E.C. Porter Goes to Russia to 
Work Out Plans for Greater Commerce with Muscovite Empire,” American Artisan and Hardware 
Record, December 23, 1916, 26.   
38 Box 3, Folder 4, Harper Papers. On services the organization provided, see James K. Libbey, “The 
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce,” Diplomatic History 9 (3) (1985), 234-35.  
39 “Commercial Russia,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1916, 7.  
 23 
A prominent group of Moscow businessmen founded the organization’s Russian 
counterpart, the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce, in 1914. Like its American 
equivalent, the chamber set out to open Russia to American trade and investment, and vice 
versa.40 Its leader, Nikolai Guchkov, the former mayor of Moscow, hailed from a prominent 
Moscow business dynasty composed of wealthy, politically active industrialists with close 
connections to the moderate-right Octobrist party in the Duma.41 In April 1916, just before 
leaving the United States to return to Petrograd, the organization’s Vice President Alexander 
Behr told the press that he planned to “lay before [the] Russian government and business-
interests facts concerning the position of [the United States] and the assistance it can furnish 
Russia in its future development.”42 Thus both Behr and Porter, and the institutions they 
represented, strove for a common goal. 
Not surprisingly, these types of associations and the availability of technical aid to 
businessmen led to a surge of confidence on economic prospects in Russia within the business 
community. Many took concrete steps to trade with Russia. For example, in late 1916, Seattle 
boasted that its newly renovated Port Warden had exceeded the amount of foreign trade 
conducted through San Francisco’s port. A major reason for the increase, claimed the Seattle 
Star, was Frank Waterhouse, the owner of a shipping fleet docked in the harbor, who decided to 
grow his convoy “AMAZINGLY,” by adding some eight or nine vessels to the twenty-two he 
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already used to move goods from the American northwest to Europe and, in particular, 
Vladivostok. The reason for Waterhouse’s decision was that Vladivostok had ordered $3,186,617 
worth of goods during the previous summer, and the Russian government bought $22 million 
worth of steel from American firms, both of which would ship to eastern Russia through Seattle 
using Waterhouse’s fleet.43 Not deterred by his inability to move freight across the Atlantic, a 
zone fraught with German U-boats targeting vessels attempting to bring supplies to the Allies, 
Waterhouse was so confident that trade with Russia would be simple and highly profitable that 
he opted for the less perilous Pacific route and felt justified in purchasing additional ships to do 
so. Indeed, across the United States men like him made similar preparations to trade with Russia 
since they believed they could depend on institutions such as the American-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce and the Guaranty Trust Company to assist them in the venture, but also because they 
saw a rise in demand for their products in Russia. Indeed, total American exports to Russia 
increased from $169,993,904 during 1915 to $470,508,254 during 1916, an almost four fold or 
290 percent leap.44 
 Business tycoons’ confidence also surged due to news of a corresponding expansion of 
trade infrastructure in Russia. Shipping companies received news that Russian authorities had 
dredged new ship spaces in Vladivostok harbor in order to accommodate the “largely increasing 
volume of ocean traffic” sailing into the port and that the city featured new, enlarged warehouses 
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well connected to the rest of Russia by railroads.45 The Seattle Star noted that “with the 
extending of railroads in Russia, [Seattle’s] port will undoubtedly be called upon to deliver a 
greater portion of goods to [Russia] than ever before.”46 A representative of Dow Jones and 
Company, an American financial information firm, spoke with Russian Commercial Attaché C.J. 
Medzikhovsky and, in response to the conversation, wrote that the development of shipping 
infrastructure in Archangelsk, a northwestern Russian city on the White Sea, had “created 
facilities for shipping to and from Russia that ensures its prosperity in later years.” To match the 
augmentation of shipping facilities in Archangelsk, the Russian government also engaged in 
“railroad construction in northern Russia . . . on an enormous scale.”47  
The press insisted that Russia was undergoing a profound and rapid economic and even 
social renaissance, prompting some to compare the emerging economic opportunities to 
“something akin to the old call of the west” in mid-nineteenth century America. Russians worked 
day and night with “feverish haste” to expand railroads in their country, and were said to staff 
factories stretching between Moscow and Petrograd that were “Running Night and Day” to 
produce “munitions of war, clothing and the varied necessities of the empire’s multimillions.”48 
Moreover, American travelers to the country brought back word that Russia’s 
involvement in WWI improved the conditions of its peasant masses, since military training was 
teaching them to be “unwilling to go back to their old methods of life,” which included using 
“only pieces of bark for shoes” and being generally “unkempt [and] ignorant with regard to 
every phase of better living.” These changes in peasants’ expectations would, in turn, make the 
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more than 25 million of them enlisted in the Russian army ready to “throw their power into 
industrial energy in field or factory” once the war ended.49 This emphasis on the industriousness 
of the country’s people and the rapid construction of railroads across its vast territory left the 
impression that, since Russia was industrializing even during wartime, its demand for capital 
goods such as heavy machinery, steel, and the like would only increase in the near future due to 
continuing industrialization.  
In short, the press painted a reassuring and propitious portrait of the country during the 
last months of Nicholas II’s rule, and the business community responded. Yet the truncated view 
of Russia that America received was a selective one, since it emphasized only those elements of 
Russian economics, politics, and history necessary to explain American opportunities for 
investment and sales within the country. Though optimistic rhetoric on this topic was abundant, 
academic knowledge of the country’s development, political climate, culture, and history was 
not. 
 
Harper and Slavic Studies on the Eve of Revolution 
 
 On the eve of the Russian revolutions of 1917, Slavic and Russian studies remained in 
their infancy in the United States. Before and during WWI formal academic courses on Russian 
literature, politics, and history were scarce and peripheral in the American intellectual, social, 
and cultural realms.50 The field had neither the personnel nor the intellectual infrastructure within 
academia and the wider world to produce significant scholarly inquiry into the peoples, cultures, 
and history of Russia.  
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 Knowledge of the region tended to be spotty and shallow, resting in a mere handful of 
scholars.51 In 1916, Robert Kerner, a professor of history at the University of Missouri, proposed 
founding the first American peer-reviewed journal focusing on the Slavic world.52 Though such a 
journal of Russian politics and history, the Russian Review, existed in England at the time, no 
such American equivalent did.53 Moreover, so-called “Russian experts” were scarce, elevating 
men such as George Noyes of the University of California at Berkeley and Leo Weiner of 
Harvard, both of whom had only scant knowledge of Russia, to leading positions in the field. 
Often a single individual taught all of a given university’s Russian studies courses, including 
Russian language, literature, and history.54 Few graduate students pursued doctoral work in the 
field. Before WWII American universities that offered graduate work in Slavic studies granted a 
total of forty-three PhDs in all disciplines and geographic regions in the field, most of which 
were conferred after 1917 when Russian émigrés fleeing civil war in their homeland staffed 
Russian studies departments in select American universities.55  
Given the nature of Russian Studies in the U.S. at the start of WWI, Harper was 
genuinely unique, even among America’s handful of Slavic experts, since he was the first 
American to dedicate an entire academic career solely to the study of Russian politics and 
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history.56 Another first in the nascent field, Harper offered courses to graduate students pursuing 
academic or diplomatic careers focused on Russia.57 His extensive in-country experience in 
Russia set him apart from other scholars and, thus, his knowledge of the country was in demand. 
 More important for Harper’s credibility in the public’s eye was a perception, perpetuated 
in mass circulation periodicals that published his writings, that he was the nation’s “foremost 
authority on Russia.”58 Take, for instance, the fact that commentators wrote that Harper had 
“first hand information in regard to Russian conditions,” and therefore rare and sought after 
knowledge.59 An article in the ladies section of the Chicago Tribune commented that even 
though Harper’s lecture to a group of Chicago aristocrats and their wives on “Russia during 
wartime” was “the most impersonal lecture one ever went to,” the professor’s knowledge of the 
subject was so thorough that some observers believed he “must have been hovering over Russia 
among the cherubim in a rosy cloud” due to his extraordinary knowledge of the country and its 
people. The article’s author claimed that “nobody could possibly be as wise as Prof. Samuel 
Harper” on Russia, since he had visited the country ten times and had “been on Russian soil for 
several months past and was just home.”60 Thus despite whether or not Harper’s analysis of 
Russia was accurate, his status as a public intellectual and a “Russian expert” did much to 
convince the public that it was.  
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Harper and American Business 
This perception of Harper, combined with his ties to business associations, led him to 
weigh in on and, therefore, heavily influence the conversation surrounding expectations for 
American trade in Russia during and after WWI. He did so by both maintaining regular 
correspondence with business figures, to whom he gave advice on economic conditions in 
Russia, and with trade and business organizations that sought to foster economic ties with the 
country. Harper also communicated with the public and a broader audience of businessmen and 
entrepreneurs through articles he published in newspapers, magazines, and trade journals. He 
appears to have purposefully worked to keep both of these segments of the country informed on 
the progress of Russian affairs, viewing it as his primary contribution to public knowledge of 
Russia during WWI.61 
 Harper officially affiliated himself with various organizations whose goals were to foster 
economic ties between Russia and the United States. For example, he was one of the top forty 
ranking members of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce.62 Similarly, the editorial 
board of a journal of similar aims published by the International Manufacturer Sales Company, 
the Russian-American Journal of Commerce, frequently solicited Harper to write articles for the 
publication, claiming that it supported his positions on economic relations between the two 
countries. The organization even invited him to be its secretary in 1916, though he declined the 
position.63  
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 Harper developed extensive personal contacts in the business world. One of the most 
important of them was with Henry Ford, which Gaston Plaintiff, one of the company’s top 
executives and a close confidant of Ford, mediated. Plaintiff noted that Ford hoped “to form a 
Russian company and open plants over there [in Russia] for low priced automobiles and traction 
machine[s].” Wanting to aid the company, he sought the advice of a “man understanding 
[Russian] conditions, language, etc.” For this reason, Plaintiff argued, Harper would be a “great 
asset to the company.”64 Plaintiff assured Harper that he “had a long talk with Mr. Ford 
regarding you personally, and have explained to him your experience in Russia . . . and he is very 
much interested.” Days later Harper and Ford scheduled a hunting trip in Michigan, during 
which they discussed “conditions in Russia” and their relevance to the company’s prospects for 
opening factories and selling its products there.65 
 Harper also maintained contact with small business owners. For example, he corrected 
and translated several sets of Russian industrial blueprints for a small business owner in 
Chicago.66 He attended the first meeting of the International Manufacturer Sales Company, 
which met on January 16, 1916, in Chicago.67 The twenty-five companies represented at the 
meeting included JI Case Plow Works, American Steam Gage and Valve Company, New York 
Rubber Company, American Hoist and Derrick Company, and numerous other manufacturing 
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enterprises, most of which dealt in either heavy machinery manufacturing or other durable 
goods.68 
Individual salesmen from large corporations likewise communicated with Harper, 
seeking his advice on several topics, one of which was how to acquire a working knowledge of 
Russian in order to sell their company’s products in the country. Frederick Dellnatt, a plant 
manager for the Case Threshing Machine Company, wrote to Harper that he was willing to travel 
from his Wisconsin home to Chicago to discuss how he could learn more Russian.69 The owner 
of a Chicago construction company noted that he had been “hammering” away at the basics of 
the Russian language for several weeks, all to no avail. To better his speaking and reading skills 
in the foreign tongue, he planned on signing up for a “down town class [in Chicago] in 
Russian.”70  
The class to which he referred was one of many that Harper and the University of 
Chicago set up in downtown Chicago in 1916 to accommodate businessmen’s and salesmen’s 
growing demand for learning the language. The University of Chicago’s chancellor’s office 
understood the needs of men such as Frederick Dellnatt and responded in a tangible way: “There 
is a pressing and growing demand for Americans who know Russian” reads a memorandum from 
the office. “This demand” it claims “has been reported to the University of Chicago from many 
institutions, corporations and firms.” In order to accommodate it, the university proposed “to 
offer the Russian [course]work at a place and time convenient to downtown businessmen and 
workers.” These classes were open only to non-undergraduates over the age of twenty-one who 
had obtained the dean’s permission to register as “unclassified” students.71  
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As the university’s sole authority on Russia, Harper oversaw and conducted these classes. 
In doing so, he stepped into a major undertaking, especially considering the number of students 
who enrolled in them–Chicago’s branch of the International Harvester Corporation alone signed 
up several dozen of its employees and salesmen.72 Yet, these courses, which attempted to give 
businessmen a working knowledge of “one of the most difficult of the modern languages,” met 
only four hours per week over the course of twelve weeks, hardly enough time to give someone 
with no knowledge of the language any ability to communicate in it, particularly since Harper 
made no “attempt . . . to introduce conversation” at this level.73 Even so, by teaching Russian in 
this way, Harper implicitly fostered the assumption that the language skills he taught would be 
sufficient to communicate with Russians for business purposes. Furthermore, these courses and 
the knowledge he claimed they gave students assumed that technical skills, such as language, 
were the most difficult prerequisites to overcome for doing business in Russia–not its political 
system or culture. 
Harper also met the general and business publics’ demands for information on economic 
opportunities in Russia through articles and opinion pieces in trade journals, newspapers, and 
magazines. In these writings, he argued that enormous economic opportunity for American 
goods and capital in Russia would endure after the war, since Russia’s political system was 
becoming more democratic and western, and because the country remained in the early stages of 
economic development. For example, Harper emphasized that Russia was a “comparatively . . .  
underdeveloped country” and that, for this reason, “a huge demand for manufactured goods” in 
Russia would only grow in the years to come, meaning that “for years vast quantities of 
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manufactured products will have to be imported.”74 Yet the demand that would “last for a long 
time” lay in Russia’s need for “complicated machinery.”75 In an article in the bulletin of the 
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Harper wrote that “it should be realized that there is 
plenty of room in Russia.” By this, he showed that not only was “official Russia” and its 
government willing and ready to see American economic activity in the country, but that the 
“Russian business public” was also “keen . . . for more developed and direct trade relations 
between the two countries.”76 The fact that Russians were “fair and honorable in their business 
dealings” would only make transactions more facile.77  
Since much of Harper’s argument on the demand for American goods and investment in 
Russia rested on the assumption that the country was underdeveloped and backward, dissecting 
his understanding of these tropes and how they corresponded to economic and political reality in 
Russia at the time is critical. On the eve of Russia’s involvement in WWI, the country had the 
world’s fifth largest economy, surpassed only by that of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany. Between 1885 and 1913, Russia’s economy grew at a rate of 3.25 percent 
per year, a rate that only countries such as Canada, the United States, Japan, and Australia 
exceeded. A wealthy, yet fragmented, business elite headed by families including the Guchkovs, 
Raibushinskis, and Momontovs began to form in Moscow as early as the 1840s and its offspring, 
whose wealth came primarily from textile manufacturing, dominated the Russian economic 
scene in the last decades of the nineteenth century.78 Between 1905 and 1914 Russia developed a 
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thriving advertising industry that promoted an impressively wide array of consumer goods to a 
broad swath of its populace and, in many ways, mirrored the west’s emphasis on consumption.79 
In the late 1890s, Russian oil production exceeded that of the United States, since it produced 35 
percent of the world’s oil supply and threatened to overtake Standard Oil’s near universal 
monopoly of the market.80 Yet, even though Russia’s economy ranked among the largest in the 
world, grain and agricultural products made up a significant percentage of its output, while 
industrial goods comprised a relatively small portion.81 Unlike many western countries, Russian 
utilized a system of state capitalism, in which the government pushed industrialization and 
formulated the country’s economic policy with little to no input from Russian business circles.82  
Though there were some appreciable differences in the American and Russian 
economies, portraying the latter as underdeveloped or backward carried with it a highly specific 
set of connotations; namely an implicit comparison between American and European economies 
and the Russian economy, which failed to live up to western standards. In a sense, the 
backwardness trope also indicated that Harper thought Russia should be developing toward a 
liberal, constitutional system. Not content with Russian state capitalism, he portrayed the country 
as underdeveloped to justify his belief that only American investment would modernize it. 
Perhaps most importantly, the notion of Russian backwardness made clear that the country’s 
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economy did not have the capacity to manufacture complex goods requiring expensive capital 
and a highly skilled workforce. An underdeveloped Russian economy was not so much one that 
needed to expand or diversify, but one that presented special opportunities to American 
businessmen who could supply those needs in which it lagged. 
According to Harper, Russia’s demand for “complex machinery” was so pressing, in fact, 
that it led Russians to “want Americans to establish factories in Russia.” Doing so, he argued, 
would enable the country to have the manufactured goods that it needed in order to survive the 
war and rebuild from it. The relationship worked because Russians implicitly trusted the 
government of the United States, he argued. American capital was “especially welcome,” 
claimed Harper, “because Russia believes that such capital does not come as the advance 
political agenda of a foreign government.”83 Here referring to a fear that Germans owned the 
empire’s key means of production, Harper portrayed Russia as fearing that German influence 
over its industrial sector would harm future economic development. Indeed Germany and its 
banks did play a significant role in the Russian banking system and economy, since the country 
depended heavily on Berlin and Vienna for capital at this time.84 Nonetheless, historian Peter 
Gatrell argues that tsarist Russia’s economy was not a “semi-colony” of western European 
nations collectively, or of Germany specifically, as Harper seemed to believe it was.85 Moscow, 
Russia’s business capital, saw remarkably little foreign investment, almost all of which 
concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy businessmen.86 Even so, Harper argued that the 
United States alone had a special role in aiding Russia economically by providing reliable, no-
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strings-attached investment. He maintained that Russia was no longer willing to endure German 
domination of its industry, thereby bolstering prospects for American investment.  
Yet Harper’s claims did not fully correspond with Russian reality. Historian Eric Lohr 
has argued that immediately before and during WWI, a movement to make the Russian economy 
“less cosmopolitan, more national, more Russian” gained steam. This campaign targeted German 
owned businesses and domestically produced German goods and sought to marginalize or 
eliminate other foreign investment in the empire. A series of riots in Moscow in May 1915 
ransacked all businesses bearing foreign names. Suspicious that the Singer Sewing Machine 
Company engaged in espionage by gathering local economic data to formulate sales strategies, 
Russian authorities accused the company of being run by Germans, plotting against the tsar, and 
soon closed Singer offices across the empire. These actions prompted J.P. Morgan, a large 
American investor in Russia, to threaten to withdraw his investment and lobby the American 
government not to extend credit to Russia.87 Thus Harper’s claim that the country was eager for 
foreign investment, even if only from Americans, presented a selective interpretation of the 
Russian political situation to the American public.  
For all the untapped potential that Harper saw for American business in Russia, he made 
clear that firms and corporations needed to be careful to send their best representatives to Russia. 
Since the country was “no place for second-raters or cast-offs,” he warned that any American 
corporate representative who traveled there planning to give bribes to procure orders from the 
government would be sorely disappointed, since Russians would consider any American who did 
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so a “chump.”88 By insisting that firms cautiously select who they sent to Russia, Harper 
recommended that they lay the foundations of solid business relationships with Russians since 
their interactions would continue far beyond 1916. 
To bring Russia to life for Americans and lend credence to the advice he gave to 
businessmen, Harper vividly recounted first-hand experiences from his travels in provincial 
Russia. Consider an article he published in the Christian Science Monitor, which gave readers an 
account of the improvements in public life he believed were underway in the country. In it, 
Harper claimed that the zemstvo system, a network of provincial self-government agencies 
entitled to manage and legislate on local needs such as health and education, had invigorated the 
country’s provinces and brought infrastructure to its vast peasant countryside.89 To make his 
point, he described a 1915 trip he and an American friend took from Moscow to the “more real 
Russia.” “As we drove out from Moscow we came to a chaussee road,” wrote Harper. This road, 
which allowed the pair’s horse-drawn carriage to travel smoothly through the countryside, was a 
“ ‘Zemstvo road’ constructed and maintained by a local provincial council of the district.” As 
Harper traveled deeper into the heart of Russia with his friend, who had initiated the trip in the 
hopes of seeing the zemstvos’ rural improvements firsthand, the two began to notice several 
peasant schools flung over a fifty-mile stretch of road. Part of “the network of primary schools 
which the Zemstva have gradually developed,” they eventually gave way to a zemstvo hospital, 
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where the two stopped for lunch. After their meal, Harper and his companion watched as their 
carriage driver took them past a “model farm run by the agricultural experts of the Zemstvo.”90 
 After their trip, Harper felt that he had succeeded in demonstrating to his friend that the 
“benevolent functions” of Russia’s system of local self-government uplifted “the broader masses 
of the people, both materially and morally.”91 Given his other writings on economic opportunity 
in Russia, it is hardly surprising that Harper commented favorably on a system of self-
government that would both make the country more civically developed and democratic, while 
building infrastructure capable of supporting a high volume of trade and development. For him, 
the two went hand in hand. 
 
The Implications of Harper’s Interpretation 
Harper’s vision for Russia turned on an optimistic outlook that envisioned it developing 
into a liberal, constitutional order, hopefully without bloodshed.92 His framework for 
understanding the country in 1916 endured for decades, shaping historical writing on the Russian 
Revolution. Historians of the 1960s revisited Russia’s political and economic development 
between 1905 and 1917 in order to assess the tsarist regime’s viability. Referred to in 
contemporary historiographical parlance as optimists, those who argued that the state could have 
evolved into a constitutional monarchy if war had not broken out emphasized many of the same 
facts that Harper did, including the development of infrastructure, economic expansion within 
the Russian empire, and improvements in the lot of the peasant.93 Yet, this view, which Cold 
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War, anti-Soviet historiography reinforced, came under fire from historians Leopold Haimson 
and Theodore Von Laue, who paved the way for a younger cohort, the pessimists, who argue that 
the tsarist system and the society it oversaw had little or no longterm viability and that a 
revolution of some sort was likely. Writing during the global social turmoil of the 1960s and the 
Vietnam War, the pessimists’ arguments found fertile soil, gained traction and, today, represent 
the dominant interpretation in the historiography of the Russian Revolution.94 Harper’s 
optimistic view, then, went virtually unchallenged for nearly five decades. 
 In practical terms, Harper’s views fed into the public discourse on Russia and mingled 
with it to produce a set of expectations that seemed favorable to the American public at large and 
to the American business elite, who had a direct stake in Russia’s economic and political future. 
Sudden increases in trade with the country during the war only served to confirm this idea. This 
situation would present an opportunity in which Russians and American business professionals 
could equally benefit. On the one hand, Russians would finally have access to the goods that 
their backward economy proved unable to produce and could, in turn, use them to rebuild their 
country after WWI. On the other hand, Americans would develop more trade infrastructure in 
their own country, all the while reaping profits from sales and investment in Russia. This dialog 
between Harper, the business world, and the American public made it highly reasonable for the 
average American citizen or business professional to look forward to a political and economic 
future for Russia that resembled that of the United States and other western liberal democracies 
of the time.  
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Harper’s depiction of Russia left no room for social revolution. In keeping with these 
predictions, he published an article in the Chicago Tribune in which he argued that WWI brought 
rapid economic modernization and improved Russian peasants’ living conditions. He concluded 
that “as for revolution, why, everywhere I heard people say ‘we are working for the army.’”95 
After all, Russia was too busy democratizing, modernizing, and winning the war against 
Germany to contemplate a revolution. 
 
Conclusion 
By interpreting Russia’s future in this way, Harper steered the public conversation even 
farther toward conceptualizing Russia as a land of untapped economic potential than it already 
did. Operating in an environment in which news of economic opportunity in Russia was 
widespread, his trusted and authoritative take both reinforced and added to the predominant 
narrative. Moreover, by insisting on the presence of broader, less immediate political changes 
afoot in the country, Harper gave the impression that Russia would become a democratic nation-
state uplifted by free trade–not home to a revolution that would overthrow the autocracy and set 
up a weak Provisional Government that a radical socialist party would come to power by 
displacing. In short, Harper helped to create a narrowly defined set of expectations for Russia 
that would be hard-pressed to account for the country’s subsequent development. This blueprint, 
not necessarily the reality of Russian development, would color both Harper’s, the business 
elite’s, and the American public’s understanding of the next chapter in Russia’s history: the 
momentous revolutions of February and October 1917.  
 
 
                                                        
95 “No Separate Peace for Russia, Prof. Harper Says,” Chicago Tribune, February 9, 1916, 3.  
 41 
Chapter 2: 
From “a bloodless revolution in a day” to “whole-hoggers:” Harper Interprets 
Russia’s Year of Revolution 
 
 The year 1917 brought two revolutions to Russia. The first, on February 22, toppled 
Nicholas II and the 304-year-old Romanov dynasty and replaced it with a Provisional 
Government.96 This body, which initially comprised primarily Constitutional Democrats 
(Cadets) and Octobrists, liberal parties, was set to rule until an elected Constituent Assembly 
resolved the country’s political future. Yet on the same day a Duma committee formed the 
Provisional Government, compromising businessmen and members of the professional 
intelligentsia, a revolutionary body, the Petrograd Soviet, also emerged. One of many soviets, or 
councils, spread across Russia, it drew its membership from and represented workers, soldiers, 
and eventually peasants.97 Backed resolutely by the country’s socialist parties, the body gave 
voice to the Russian masses’ political, social, and economic demands. As a result, the Petrograd 
Soviet boasted much power and popular legitimacy from the start. Contemporaries used the term 
dvoevlastie (dual power) to describe this potentially explosive situation in which the Provisional 
Government and the Petrograd Soviet shared power. During the year, moderate socialist parties 
within the Soviet, including the Socialist Revolutionaries, Russia’s most popular political party, 
and the moderate Social Democrats, the Mensheviks, formed a succession of coalition 
governments with the “bourgeois” Cadets. Only the Bolsheviks, a far-left socialist fringe party in 
early 1917, advocated a transfer of all governmental power to the soviets. But, as the Provisional 
Government continued fighting an unpopular war, the Bolshevik viewpoint gathered rising 
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support until, by the fall of 1917, the slogan “All Power to the Soviets” transformed into an 
expression of the popular will that signaled the increasingly left, socialist orientation of Russian 
politics. As a result, on the night of October 25, Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks overthrew 
the Provisional Government. When the Constituent Assembly convened in January 1918, the 
Bolsheviks shut the body down.98   
 Commenting on the situation, Harper noted that his “sympathies . . . were in the liberal 
camp,” thereby signaling his allegiance to the Cadets, Russia’s most liberal party.99 As historian 
William G. Rosenberg has argued, the Cadets represented “basic European liberal traditions,” 
including an emphasis on civil liberties for all Russian citizens and a desire to see Russia develop 
along a laissez-faire, capitalist economic and political trajectory. Comprising mostly 
professionals and intellectuals, the Constitutional Democrats garnered far more support in cities 
than in rural areas. Structuring its foreign policy around liberal principles, the party’s platform 
stressed that Russia’s duty was to “uphold her foreign obligations, regardless of domestic strife” 
and, therefore, to “stand shoulder to shoulder” with the Allies by remaining in WWI until 
victory. In keeping with this commitment, the Cadet leadership underscored that it would engage 
in no social reform, would maintain stern military discipline, and would not cooperate with 
anarchists or antigovernment parties.100  
The pressures of war and disagreements over Russia’s role as a member of the Allies, 
however, split the party into left and right factions. The former supported cooperation with 
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moderate socialist parties and envisioned Russia eventually exiting the war without necessarily 
winning it. The right faction, on the other hand, represented a more conservative strain that 
advocated war until victory, civil rights, capitalism, and the importance of standing for national 
rather than class-based interests. The right wing rejected cooperation with socialist parties.101 
 Harper’s long-time friend Paul Miliukov led the Cadet’s right wing. Originally a 
professor of history at Moscow University, Miliukov had lectured on Russian history and politics 
at the University of Chicago in 1903, thus giving Harper and his family exposure to his ideas.102 
Soon after the February Revolution, Harper congratulated Miliukov on the large number of 
liberals in the Provisional Government, thereby indicating that he saw Miliukov’s stance as 
representative of the entire party and of Russian liberalism more generally.103 Owing to his 
personal relationship with Miliukov, Harper had a stake in seeing his close acquaintance’s views 
succeed.104 Yet, not by chance, his political preferences aligned with those of the right Cadets. 
Thus to see this group gain popular support among the Russian masses and traction in the 
Provisional Government was to see his own vision for Russia’s future and the United States’s 
geopolitical interests realized in a tangible way.  
 In this chapter I trace the rise and fall of Harper’s optimism beginning in March 1917, 
when he told America that “the real Russia has finally triumphed” and that democracy had 
emerged, until the end of the year when, as a result of the October Revolution, he claimed that 
Bolshevik “extremism” destroyed “new Russia’s” future by negating the February Revolution’s 
liberal gains. In the interim, Harper’s optimism crested, plateaued, and began to wane in 
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response to rapid political developments. Following the way in which he broadcasted his highly 
influential opinion to the public, I argue that Harper measured Russia’s 1917 developments 
against the right Cadets’ political vision.105 Therefore I contend that this perspective transformed 
Harper from an excited optimist to a troubled, somewhat skeptical observer of Russia’s year of 
revolution and led him to encourage the American public to adopt a similar stance.  
 According to historian Peter Filene, American public opinion almost unanimously 
supported the February Revolution, primarily because it overthrew the Russian autocracy.106 
This mass support had roots in American views of conflict during WWI, which saw the war as a 
battle between democracy and authoritarianism, and classified Nicholas II and his government as 
the latter.107 Earlier commentators such as George Kennan, whose 1891 account Siberia and the 
Exile System condemned the Russian autocracy for its treatment of political opponents, had 
already depicted this stark contrast decades before WWI began.108 In the late tsarist era, news of 
beaten, cold female political prisoners in Siberia circulated widely in American and western 
European newspapers, garnering sympathy for the prisoners, depicting the tsarist autocracy as 
ruthless and disrespectful of human life, and, therefore, drawing a line between authoritarian 
Russia and the United States.109 
Consequently, Americans celebrated the autocracy’s downfall. On March 25, 1917, 
fifteen hundred Americans gathered in New York’s Manhattan Opera House to celebrate 
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“Russian democracy.”110 Former President Theodore Roosevelt asserted that he rejoiced “that 
Russia, the hereditary friend of the country, has ranged herself on the side of orderly liberty, of 
enlightened freedom . . . by free nations throughout the world.”111 The Society of the Friends of 
Russian Freedom, an organization that opposed the tsarist autocracy, wrote that “the Russian 
Revolution [of February] has freed a people and a race and has made more secure the foundation 
of liberty for all men. It is an event whose magnitude can hardly be estimated.”112 These 
optimistic understandings of Russian developments primed the American public for a new, 
democratic Russia.  
 
Harper and the February Revolution 
 Harper’s optimism crested in the days immediately following the February Revolution, 
an event that he welcomed because, as he argued, it set Russia on a path toward liberalism that 
the Provisional Government and, later, the Constituent Assembly would inevitably follow. He 
believed that the revolution was “clearly a success” since it overthrew Nicholas II.113 Excited at 
the political ramifications of the tsar’s deposition, he spread his optimistic view in newspapers 
almost as soon as the event took place.114 
 The United States government clamored for Harper’s understanding of the Russian 
autocracy’s downfall and what type of political system he believed would fill the void it left. 
Days after the tsar abdicated, the Department of State asked Harper to telegraph his “views as to 
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the revolt at Petrograd and its significance.”115 In his response, Harper focused on the 
revolution’s political nature and argued that it promoted democracy and stability. Underscoring 
that fact that, since the Revolution of 1905, the Duma promoted “public organizations to create 
conditions that would make it possible for Russia to bring into force all her strength,” he 
depicted the February Revolution as the logical outgrowth of the Duma’s twelve-year-long battle 
for democracy. He stressed that the event was a “political revolution and not [of] a social 
character,” correctly emphasizing that Russia’s new government did not seek to alter the social 
order, but merely reorganized the political system by overthrowing the tsar.116 Harper sent the 
Department of State short biographies of the liberals in the Provisional Government to illustrate 
this change.117  
Moreover, Harper contended that the event’s political character boded well for Russia’s 
continued participation in the war. Because the revolution lacked a social dimension, Harper 
argued that the Russian masses, including the large numbers of peasants and others serving in the 
army, supported the army. He concluded that the revolution meant “more effective prosecution 
of war and war until victory”–an end that both aligned with the right Cadets’ preferences and 
favored the United States and the Allies.118  
 Spreading his interpretation of the February Revolution in newspapers, Harper argued 
that the event resulted from an organic, evolutionary rise of Russian democracy. Here, he traced 
the revolution’s roots to 1861, when Tsar Alexander II freed Russia’s serfs and took the “first 
step toward freedom.” Harper also underscored that the Revolution of 1905 formed the basis for 
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the February Revolution.119 "Russia emerged from the eighteenth century into the modern period 
with two outstanding political institutions–the institution of democracy and the institution of 
serfdom," he wrote. He pointed out that various stages of "liberation," such as serf emancipation 
and the move for local government (zemstvo), constituted nineteenth-century Russian history’s 
most important events and he characterized their result, the Duma, as "more representative than 
many of our western parliaments."120 In his view, the February Revolution represented Russian 
history’s zenith. 
 Harper also highlighted what he viewed as an inevitable confrontation between the 
constructive, democratic forces of the Duma and the destructive, antiquated tsarist autocracy, and 
claimed that this conflict gave birth to the February Revolution. For example, he explained that 
the event was “approved by all classes” since “the Russian nation . . . [was] back of the Duma in 
its action.” The Duma clashed with the reactionary Russian tsar and, therefore, “could not 
cooperate with the existing government.” Yet, unlike Nicholas II, its legitimacy came from the 
people. “There is not only a general, vague backing by the people” for the Duma, wrote Harper, 
“but a specific strong backing in the several organizations of the nation.”121  
 Harper thus crafted a narrative that urged readers to revere the February Revolution. 
Explaining the tsarist government’s interference with public organizations and the Duma, he 
wrote that “several times in the course of the last two years, the government has interfered with 
these organizations . . . charging that their real object was to get political power.” But, claimed 
Harper, they sought to promote “a state of mutual confidence between the government and the 
country, so that the resources of the country could be mobilized in the most efficient manner.” 
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Using Russia’s resources in this way benefitted the United States since the Duma aimed to 
“secure conditions that will make it possible for Russia to prosecute this war with all its 
resources and to eliminate all possibilities of a premature peace.”122 This revolution, he believed, 
ensured that Russia continued to make substantial contributions to the war effort, guaranteeing 
that the United States would not share an undue portion of wartime human and financial burdens. 
Russia’s new political status intrigued both the American business community and 
various civil organizations, and they reached out to Harper for information that he readily 
provided. Yet historian John Charles Chalberg argues that Harper cared little for and was slightly 
more than “disinterested” in economic matters in Russia during 1917.123 The evidence, however, 
paints another picture, one that depicts Harper working actively in the business community, 
taking a keen interest in the Russian economy, and constantly reassuring American businessmen 
that the February Revolution gave birth to an even more business friendly Russia.  
Individual businessmen often began correspondence with Harper to seek his advice on 
doing business with Russia. Many of their concerns revolved around whether or not the 
country’s new government was sufficiently stable and friendly toward private business to 
warrant investors risking their capital there. Sal Stein explained to Harper that “the resources of 
the great Russian Empire are now at America’s command. The American government is the only 
one in a position now to be Russia’s creditor and Russia will prove to be a good debtor & client. 
Capitalists & investors should study the economic problems of Russia and study her from every 
angle.”124 Walter Hubbard of International Harvester invited Harper to speak to the company’s 
executives, since his knowledge of Russia’s political and economic climate was “directly 
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connected to the Harvester Company’s business.”125 The Russian Information Bureau, an 
organization formed before the revolution to “furnish American interests with accurate and 
authoritative information in regard to financial, commercial and cultural conditions in Russia” 
facilitated an advisory relationship between Harper and leading business figures, including the 
Vice President of National City Bank and Charles M. Schwab, president of Bethlehem Steel 
Company and a manufacturing tycoon.126 Only days after the tsar’s fall, Marshall Beymer, the 
owner of a Wisconsin furniture company, asked Harper about “the probable outcome of the 
credit situation in Russia to-day” since he had “a little money invested in Russian credit and the 
inclination to put more into it.”127  
In his responses, Harper always insisted that businessmen and investors stood to gain 
from the February Revolution. Responding to Beymer, he wrote that “it is clear that the recent 
changes in Russia will mean greater internal economic development and greater opportunities for 
foreign capital and enterprises . . . and these developments will surely bring a more solid 
financial foundation in Russia.”128 Speaking to the Chicago’s Business Men’s Prosperity Club, 
Harper dubbed the February Revolution a “bloodless revolution in a day” that destroyed no 
business infrastructure.129 Reassuring Cyrus McCormick, owner of the International Harvester 
Corporation, who worried over rumors of Russia’s lack of credit and the decline of the ruble’s 
value, Harper wrote that the liberals in charge of the Provisional Government made an 
“announcement of . . . credit put at the disposition of the new government,” a statement that 
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evidently revived McCormick’s confidence.130 He consoled Frederick W. Allen, an executive of 
Lee, Higginson and Company, a Boston based investment back that conducted business with 
Russia, that the Provisional Government was “always . . . very sympathetic towards America, 
and thus have stated their readiness to cooperate with Americans, wishing to examine the many 
opportunities offered in Russia.”131  
Arguing that Russia was safe for investment, an inherently forward-looking, long-term 
venture that depends heavily on political and economic stability, Harper depicted the country as 
a peaceful, stable land ruled by wise, business-friendly leaders. In doing so, he fostered 
confidence among businessmen and created the expectation that investment in the summer of 
1917 was a sound venture since the country’s new government fostered free markets, welcomed 
foreign capital, and sought stability. Russia was not only friendly toward American businessmen 
who sought to sell there, but was now on such steady political and economic footing that it 
represented a safe repository for American investment. 
 In the spring of 1917, several social clubs and civil organizations asked Harper to inform 
them on recent changes in Russia. In his talks, Harper highlighted the February Revolution’s 
legitimacy and argued that it positively impacted Russia and the Allies. For example, the After 
Dinner Club in Moline, Illinois, requested Harper’s presence in May 1917 and printed a flyer 
that announced that his talk would be on “The Russian Revolution.” Harper’s words on its front 
cover quickly summarized his views on the event:  
 “The real Russia has finally triumphed. 
 The aim of the revolution and its one justification was to win the war. 
 It was purely political and not a social revolution. 
 The revolution was the rounding out of a long process.”132 
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Yet this line of reasoning did not come naturally to many Americans, Harper believed. 
He never doubted the Provisional Government’s efficacy, but worried that pessimistic attitudes 
in the business community toward Russia’s prospects would prevent investors from risking their 
capital in the country. In May 1917, at the height of his optimism, he complained to E C Porter, 
the head of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, that he found “most distressing 
pessimism with regard to the Russian situation” in Chicago business circles.133 He lamented that 
there was “no indication in our press” that the development of Russian civil society and the 
February Revolution “would lead to the emergence of a new and . . . a better Russia.”134  
Driven by the assumption that democratic states operated on the basis of their citizenry’s 
opinions, Harper waged a battle for public opinion. To do so, he traced the roots of the 
pessimistic attitudes he encountered and often blamed the yellow press for them. He claimed that 
“dramatic, sensational news” printed in ill informed or cynical American newspapers perpetuated 
doubt on Russia’s future and gave investors cold feet when it came to doing business in the 
country.135 He chided A S Postnikov, a Russian news reporter in New York, for making what he 
perceived to be dangerous statements about prospects for democracy in Russia and 
acknowledged “I can now understand why there is so much pessimism in our American business 
circles in regard to Russia . . . [because of] men like you, who are supposed to be in touch with 
Russia.”136 Harper complained to the Associated Press about its Russian correspondent Robert C. 
Long who expected “nothing but the gradual disintegration of Russia in 1917.”137 Harper refused 
to speak to a reporter from the Chicago Tribune, a publication that he claimed was guilty of these 
practices, and insisted to one reporter that even though Russia would “hold as a republic” since 
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its situation “is becoming very good,” the paper took a “pessimistic view of the situation.”138 He 
carped to the editor of the New York Times that its Petrograd correspondent was incompetent 
since he did not report the “constructive” side of the revolution, but focused on the “purely 
disruptive” portions of Russia’s political spectrum.139 Yet, ironically, the major newspapers to 
whom he complained depicted Russia more realistically than Harper, America’s Russian expert, 
did.  
 With the benefit of hindsight, however, the fact that Long and others who Harper 
attacked gave a more accurate portrayal of Russia’s political situation seems obvious. This is 
due, in part, to the fact that most reporters did not have a personal stake in the revolution’s 
outcome, as Harper did. Yet the evidence indicates that Harper believed that those who espoused 
rival explanations were both incorrect and ignorant. The gap between these publications’ and 
Harper’s opinions shows how narrow the liberal, Cadet-oriented lens through which he viewed 
Russia actually was. Ill at ease with the idea that the country was in the middle of a political 
crisis, Harper understood Russia as he wanted it to be. His encounter with the press is but one 
manifestation of a desperate attempt to see Russia as something that it simply was not. 
 In an almost ritualized retelling, Harper united his disparate lines of reasoning into a 
cohesive whole in a speech he gave to the National Geographic Society in Washington D.C. on 
March 30, 1917. In it, he analyzed Russia’s “newest popular government,” dazzled the audience 
with color photographs of the Russian countryside, and projected headshots of the Provisional 
Government’s Cadets.140 He emphasized that the revolution sought to ensure Russia’s continued 
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involvement in WWI and told his audience that Russians urged the tsar’s government for years 
to allow them to organize into civic institutions that supported Russia’s involvement in the war: 
“Russian society came forward and insisted, first, that it be allowed to support the army by 
organizing all the resources of the country.” But, in order to accomplish this, the Russian people 
“demanded a new spirit of government” that would ease restrictions on nongovernmental 
organizations. The masses did not demand a new type of government, “but simply that the 
government cooperate with the people, and act in such a way as to enjoy the confidence of the 
people.” According to Harper’s view, however, the reactionary tsarist autocracy “knew that if the 
people were allowed to come in and [organize to] win the war, then they could not be sent back 
to their private business after the war.” The government harassed such organizations to prevent 
them from becoming “a permanent force in the running of the country.” To remedy this problem, 
the Russian people fomented a revolution whose aims were “the establishment of a responsible 
government, a government that would enjoy the confidence of the people determined to win a 
national war.” Depicting the February Revolution as a popularly inspired method to keep Russia 
in WWI, Harper stated that the event was “so logical, so inevitable” precisely because it 
supported the war effort and, therefore, the Allies.141 
 Harper also maintained that the Provisional Government was moderate. He claimed that 
the “most radical leaders in the new government” issued statements announcing that “even a 
workmen’s movement would be treason to the comrades fighting in the trenches.” So the 
February Revolution was “a war measure–to win the war . . . there was no sign of even a 
workmen movement.” Unlike the party that would come to power in October, the Provisional 
Government made no radical claims and even its most extreme members fell within the 
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mainstream of Harper’s acceptable spectrum of political stances on workers’ rights and the war. 
He believed that the Provisional Government, heavily influenced by the Cadets, correctly 
recognized that social reform stood beyond its purview. 
 During his speech, Harper did not miss the opportunity to acknowledge the business 
community and how the revolution would affect its interests. He pointed out that “one cannot 
conceal the fact that Russia is economically backward,” due to centuries of failed tsarist policies. 
To prove his point, he showed pictures of rural communes and an izba (peasant hut) to 
demonstrate that prerevolutionary Russian peasants were unscrubbed and primitive.142 Relating 
the February Revolution to peasants’ consumption of technology and western goods, he argued 
that the event brought about a slow demise of peasant “backwardness” by transforming their 
economic habits: 
 “Somewhat primitive methods of agriculture are still in use, but they are gradually being  
 eliminated. Zemstvo stores are making it possible for the peasants to buy modern  
 agricultural implements, and the cooperative societies are helping. One no longer sees a  
 peasant ploughing using hand-made, primitive plows. Almost every peasant now has a  
 modern machine-made plow, and many peasants have “McCormicks” as they call them.  
 Last year . . . word reached Russia that Ford was going to manufacture a cheap tractor  
 [for sale in Russia]. Now one hears the name Ford frequently among the Russian  
 peasants. . . . In earlier years, and not so very long ago, hand machinery was still in  
 vogue.”143 
 
Harper thus signaled that the February Revolution had stepped up Russia’s economic progress 
and, along with it, its populace’s demand for manufactured goods. After all, if Russian peasants 
already plowed with a McCormick plow, what would prevent them prevent them from sewing 
with a Singer sewing machine or even buying a Ford tractor to plow their fields? 
Harper’s perspective reverberated far beyond the National Geographic Society chamber, 
finding its way into the press and influencing those who read it. After attending the talk, a 
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reporter for the Washington Post wrote that Harper had declared that “the Russian nation . . . 
insisted upon the right of all classes to organize for the efficiency of the nation and this they did 
contrary to the desires of certain members of the bureaucracy who were apprehensive, realizing 
the difficulty of disorganizing such forces later.” The writer concluded that the February 
Revolution’s aim was “the establishment of a responsible government . . . a new order of 
things.”144  
 
Harper Awaits the February Revolution’s Promises 
 Harper’s Cadet-oriented view of Russia faced a major practical and intellectual hurdle 
between May and November. The Russian populace’s increasing dissatisfaction with the 
Provisional Government’s ineffectiveness did not comport with the Cadet point of view, which 
held that the February Revolution removed the barrier between popular opinion and the long-
guarded levers of government and replaced it with an effective, democratic body. Similar to his 
contemporaries, who grappled with the differences between their western worldviews and 
Russia’s political reality, Harper faced a conundrum.145 On the one hand, he needed to defend the 
February Revolution’s virtue and inevitable success to the public yet, on the other, he wrestled 
with the fact that the Russian masses appeared increasingly apathetic to this new regime that 
prided itself on representing them. Thus his views did not change as much as they evolved due to 
an inflexible point of view that failed to capture Russian reality. 
 Harper’s effort to reconcile these mutually exclusive facts began when he claimed in 
public venues, including in letters to friends and colleagues, articles in newspapers, and 
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communication with businessmen, that the Provisional Government remained viable. He wrote 
to Harold Williams, a New Zealand journalist who often reported on Russian affairs in American 
and British newspapers, that he was “very busy writing and lecturing and emphasizing the many 
guarantees of permanency behind the new government.”146 He underscored that “there are many 
facts that seem to guarantee the permanency of the new order. I have been emphasizing that the 
men at the head of the most important departments [in the Provisional Government] are men of 
sound ideas and long experience in administrative matters.”147 A newspaper article quoted 
Harper’s assurance that Russia’s situation was favorable as far as foreign, or even Russian 
interests, were concerned. Harper wrote that the Provisional Government regarded itself as 
“responsible to the duma.” The Duma, in turn, was “a body elected upon a basis of restricted 
voting that gives the preponderance of membership to the capitalist and conservative classes.” 
The governing arrangement in Russia, then, had only a “sprinkling of radicals,” and gave most of 
its legislative powers to those interested in developing the country along conservative, 
capitalistic, rather than socialistic, lines.148 
 Harper also argued that this “sprinkling of radicals” and the unrest they caused in 
Petrograd represented no major threat to the Provisional Government. Only weeks before, on 
April 3, Lenin arrived from self-imposed exile in Switzerland and delivered his famous April 
Theses, in which he criticized the Provisional Government’s continued support for WWI, which 
he dubbed a “predatory imperialist war” that stemmed from the Provisional Government’s 
“capitalist nature.” He called on the Bolshevik party and the masses to lend “no support for the 
Provisional Government,” and denounced the “imperialist” body for not setting a date to convene 
the Constituent Assembly. Instead of trusting the government, he claimed, Russia should 
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conclude a separate peace with Germany, withdraw from the war, and immediately transfer all 
power to the soviets.149 In response to the so-called April Crisis, a series of violent 
confrontations on the streets of Petrograd stemming from disputes between Miliukov and his 
Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet over whether or not Russia should continue to 
prosecute the war to a decisive victory against Germany, Harper blamed the “tumult” on “Lanin” 
who he branded a “Russian doctrinaire internationalist . . . an extreme pacifist.” Lenin, reasoned 
Harper, was “absent from Russia when the [February] revolution was brewing and when it broke 
. . . he is out of touch with the situation.” Harper “refused to be worried with regard to the radical 
minority, advocating extreme measures.”150 Lenin was a member of a “small group of extremists, 
numbering not more than five percent of the Socialists in Russia,” who was completely out of 
touch with reality.151   
 In an effort to discredit Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Harper spread this interpretation of 
radicalism to government bureaucrats and the American public, likening the notion of Russia 
exiting the war with German “intrigue.” He told David F. Houston, the U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture, that he “discounted from the very beginning [the] reported movement for a separate 
peace in Russia. I knew of the existence of a small radical group of extremists in Russia itself, 
which might take this line.” Referring here to the Bolsheviks, he admitted that the party wanted 
to conclude a separate peace with Germany, but blamed “German or German-inspired sources” 
for the “separate peace movement within Russia.”152 Equating Germany with these rumors, 
whose realization would fly in the face of American war aims, Harper held foreign sources 
responsible for the separate peace idea, despite the fact that the Bolshevik party, whose idea it 
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was, gained steadily increasing popular support at the time. In a Chicago Herald editorial, he 
asked “how many times must the new government and the Russian people state that they will 
prosecute the war until victory?” He concluded that “not only has such a statement come from 
the official provisional government; it has also been made by the organized Council of Workmen 
and soldier deputies and by the Council of Soldiers.”153 German enemies, not Russians, created 
these rumors, he argued, since taking this line both masked the increasingly large fissures 
appearing in Russian politics at the time and showed that the Russian masses still supported the 
Cadets’ war aims. 
Alongside this association, Harper claimed that Russia’s “extreme radicals” made their 
far-left, socialist demands because many of them had no realistic grasp of Russian conditions in 
the summer of 1917, partially because he believed that many such “radicals” lived abroad. 
Harper maintained that their programs did not correspond to popular opinion, thereby incorrectly 
implying that the right Cadets’ platform did. Doing so pinned the political unrest on a narrow 
band of misinformed extremists, not the fact that the populace grew ever more discontented with 
the political status quo and, thus, moved to support more radical parties. In April 1917, Harper 
noted that “a great many people” in Chicago claimed to be “bona fide Russian revolutionists, and 
are planning to start for Russia immediately.” If Russia allowed these “enemies” inside, they 
would wreak havoc on the post-February liberal government and, therefore, Russia’s 
involvement in WWI. Indeed, Harper claimed to have first-hand knowledge of the situation since 
he saw Trotsky, a Bolshevik party leader, the Reds’ future Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and 
the founder of the Red Army, agitating on a dock in Halifax just before sailing for Russia, and 
recounted that “he and his people were talking pacifism and peace very frequently and openly, 
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both before their departure and on the boat.”154 Such radicals exercised a negative influence, 
however, not because of their proposed solution to Russia’s political crisis, but simply because 
they lived abroad and were “quite out of touch with the new spirit that has developed in Russia 
these last years,” despite that fact that Harper, too, spent most of his life outside of Russia.155 
Tracing these ideas within the United States, Harper attended meetings of Russian socialists in 
Chicago and reported what he heard to Richard Crane of the Department of State.156 After all, 
what would happen if radicals like Trotsky returned to Russia and convinced soldiers to 
withdraw from the conflict or to fight with less fervor?  
Harper often used the term “pacifism” to describe Russian radical socialists’ political 
ideology. He referenced a familiar American cultural and political symbol and, thus, implicitly 
compared these “radicals” to striking workers in the United Stats, thereby placing even more 
distance between the version of Russia that leaders like Lenin and Trotsky stood for, and his 
imagined rendering of it. Historians Charles F. Howlett and Robbie Lieberman argue that, during 
the first years of WWI, American pacifists such as Eugene V. Debs, a five time socialist 
candidate for president and well-known labor organizer, articulated a brand of opposition to the 
war that linked international peace with worker solidarity in America. Insisting that peace abroad 
was impossible without domestic social justice, including workers’ rights and improved working 
conditions for the masses, these pacifists coupled calls for international peace and workers’ 
rebellion in the popular American mind. Peace movements came to be linked with the Socialist 
Party of America.157 Thus, by associating Trotsky and the Bolsheviks with pacifism, Harper used 
the term as a framing device to attempt to explain why Trotsky and the Reds remained out of 
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touch with the Russian masses. By drawing on American-specific references, he likened them to 
rebelling workers and American socialists, groups that stood on the American political 
establishment’s fringes. The party, he reasoned, could not possible enjoy respect and support in a 
country whose population almost unanimously supported the Cadets and, therefore, Allied war 
aims.  
 By the end of the spring, however, Harper’s belief that Russia was “trying an experiment 
in real democracy” had not faltered. Feeling alone in this opinion, he asked Crane and the 
Department of State “why are you people so down on any one who insists on being optimistic, 
because he sees the constructive side of what is going on in Russia. I am beginning to feel that I 
am . . . looked on as a case of small pox.”158 In response to rumors of peasants seizing land and 
army desertions in Russia, Harper continued to dismiss the news as false or “irresponsible 
gossip.” Nonetheless, he commented that if these events took place, he was “ready to abandon 
optimism and expect general hell in Russia, Russia out of the conflict, and America in one devil 
of a fix.”159  
 
Optimism Declining: Harper in Russia, Summer 1917 
 In June, Harper traveled to Russia hoping to see the “historical gathering” of the 
Constituent Assembly and as an interpreter for the Root Commission, a government appointed 
group of Americans sent to befriend the Provisional Government and ensure that Russia 
remained in WWI.160 Setting itself the goal of furthering American interests in Russia, the 
commission needed a leader whose values reflected its intentions. Rumors circulated that 
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President Woodrow Wilson would name Harper its leader but, in the end, the government 
appointed Elihu Root, the former Secretary of War during the Roosevelt administration and a 
lawyer who had defended corporate titans including Andrew Carnegie.161 The commission also 
appointed Cyrus McCormick as a member, since he owned manufacturing enterprises in 
Russia.162  
 Harper gained much understanding of the country’s political situation by serving as an 
interpreter, rather than a full member. He saw scenes and people, including gatherings of angry 
workers and Lenin, that, had he been a member, might have embarrassed the mission as a 
whole.163 For instance, he “followed closely political trends, [saw] representatives of various 
parties, and [went] in the evening to the Bolshevik headquarters, where Lenin and others spoke . 
. . to large crowds.”164 He also served as “chief political adviser” to the American ambassador to 
Russia, David R. Francis, and in this capacity translated Russian newspapers, observed political 
rallies in Petrograd, and reported his findings to the embassy.165  
 Harper quickly became attuned to political life in Russia as a result of these encounters. 
He explained to Richard Crane that he had “many friends in the new government” who told him 
“the whole truth–Russia has many problems to face.” One was so severe and unprecedented that 
it warranted special attention: Russia “must at one and the same time consolidate the Revolution 
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and wage a war.” Commenting on a demonstration he saw in Petrograd, Harper wrote that “the 
Extremists organized a protest against the Provisional Government, and the War of Capitalists . . 
. there were many groups of straight anarchists.” Even though he claimed that his optimism had 
“not been shaken by . . . [these] rather disturbing tendencies,” Harper now acknowledged that a 
radical movement was underway in Russia and that, even though he believed it posed only a 
minor threat, it was a “disturbing” one.166  
Harper defended the Provisional Government, while still acknowledging the “threat” of 
radical socialists, by claiming that the “legacy of the old regime” inhibited Russia’s realization of 
the February Revolution’s promises. Historian Louise McReynolds argues that between 1905 
and 1917 an ever-widening chasm between the tsarist government, which at best nominally 
acknowledge the increasingly politically cognizant public’s need for information and a voice in 
public affairs, and the public itself, deepened, wrecking the government’s chance to loosen 
restrictions on political speech and to give the restless masses a collective voice.167 Harper 
believed that this gap, a fundamental disconnect between the former tsar and his people, limited 
the Provisional Government’s ability to censor radical socialists who challenged its legitimacy 
and, therefore, prevented it from “consolidating the conquests of the revolution.” If the 
Provisional Government engaged in censorship, he believed, it risked mimicking the “enormous . 
. . demoralization of the old policing system [okhranka]” and, in doing so, imperiled the popular 
support on which Harper believed it depended for its institutional viability.168 Thanks to this 
conundrum, the Bolsheviks enjoyed the freedom to agitate, making Russia an “open-discussion 
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school, with no restrictions on anybody.”169 The old regime’s legacy, not the Provisional 
Government’s failure to align with the populace’s political preferences, explained why Russia 
slowly descended into disorder. A hefty dose of liberalism gave this chaos the freedom to exist, 
he believed. 
 Attempting to square the reality of Petrograd riots with a revolution that he claimed had 
perpetuated peace and democracy, Harper again relied on his Cadet perspective by portraying 
Russia to U.S. government bureaucrats and the American public as an “experimental laboratory.” 
In it, other nations could learn about radical socialism’s many pitfalls. One such experiment, led 
by fanatics who “had been reading Marx all their lives, waiting for an opportunity to apply him,” 
came on July 17, 1917, when “Lenin and his crowd tried to establish a ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat.’” The event, today known as the July Days or the July Uprising, featured Petrograd 
soldiers and workers taking to the streets in opposition to the Provisional Government’s failed 
Galician offensive and calling for “All Power to the Soviets.”170 The incident alarmed Harper, 
since Petrograd’s workers and soldiers “came blame near” wrestling power from the Provisional 
Government. The near miss of this “real disaster” had value since it showed “to the world, and 
for the rest of the world, that this Utopia [far-left socialism] can be worked.” In other words, 
radical socialism and its bedfellows were real threats that countries learning from Russia’s 
experience should safeguard themselves against. Russia and the February Revolution, he 
reasoned, had “been of service to humanity.”171 In making this claim, however, Harper had both 
praised the Cadet liberals by showing that under their watch freedom of speech reigned supreme, 
and condemned radical socialism by associating it with disaster and chaos. 
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 By October, Harper’s response to Petrograd’s tumult shifted. He made clear to Charles 
Mott, a founder of General Motors Company and former mayor of Flint, Michigan, that he 
supported “any government . . . that will contribute to [Russia’s] stability” and urged that the 
United States “must back Russia to the end, and for the next years to come” to preserve order.172 
Such a government, though perhaps not the ideal Constitutional Democratic one that Harper 
lauded, would at least prevent radical-led “sporadic . . . violent . . . crisis.” He also insisted that 
stopping the Bolsheviks from coming to power in 1917 would save the United States future time 
and money, since Washington inevitably would not be able to cooperate with and, therefore, 
would depose, a radical socialist government: “a dollar spent here now will save a hundred.”173  
 By the late fall of 1917, then, Harper adopted a seemingly more nuanced view of the 
Russian situation. Yet his claims do not indicate that he was becoming a realist who judged 
Russia on its own terms. Rather, his shifting understanding speaks to the degree to which his 
Cadet-oriented perspective prevented him from seeing Russia realistically. Certain that the 
Provisional Government’s only aims were to keep Russia in the war and build democracy, 
Harper had to find reasons to account for why the liberals had not already accomplished these 
objectives, and he chose to do so by showing the roadblocks that stood in the way. Thus his 
portrayal of Russia that fall resulted from a perspective that could account only for liberal 
political evolution or a lack thereof, not socialism’s rising popularity and the Provisional 
Government’s breakdown. 
 
Harper and the October “Revolt” 
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 Harper initially believed that the October Revolution represented another manifestation 
of Petrograd’s ongoing chaos. Like the Cadets, he argued that a narrow band of radicals opposed 
to Russian democracy and the country’s ongoing involvement in the war had made possible this 
“revolt.”174 As a result, one finds extremely sparse mention of the October Revolution in 
Harper’s personal papers, a trend that parallels a dearth of newspaper articles bearing his name in 
its immediate aftermath. This absence is partially due to the fact that Harper left Russia for 
Chicago in September 1917 and, thus, did not witness the event firsthand. Yet, more importantly, 
it speaks to his perception that the Bolshevik Revolution represented little more than an 
illegitimate coup d’etat carried out without the populace’s approval. 
The American public knew little about the Bolsheviks. H J Haskell, an editor of the 
Kansas City Star, asked Harper about “the correct use of the group of words having to do with 
the Bolsheviki.” “Is Bolsheviki plural? Is the singular Bolshevik?” he queried.175 Harper 
responded that “Bolsheviki” was not the preferable term, since it described individual party 
members, but instead recommended “Bolshevism,” the ideological, political, and social system 
the party set out to create.176 Apparently confused over the terminology himself, Harper used 
three words to refer to the Bolsheviks in similar contexts within one newspaper article: 
“Bolsheviki,” “Bolshevichesky,” and “Bolosheviki.”177 
Growing pessimistic about a Cadet Russia, Harper asked Harry Pratt Judson, president of 
the University of Chicago, to excuse him from teaching for the remainder of the semester. To 
justify his request, Harper argued that his work on Russia and helping the American public 
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understand its predicament was more important than his teaching responsibilities. He observed 
that “the situation in Russia certainly looks dark these last weeks. And it looks darker each day, 
as the reports come through.” Yet he retained hope that Russia could shed the Bolshevik yoke, 
writing that “the constructive men will come forward after [Russia] has reached rock bottom.” 
Even so, he concluded, “it would seem that it is without bottom over there.”178  
 The situation appeared so dark primarily because of the Bolsheviks’ “extreme 
radicalism.” “The Bolsheviki are certainly ‘whole-hoggers’ as one might translate the word,” 
wrote Harper to William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State under former President Woodrow 
Wilson. Using the term “whole-hoggers” to depict the Bolsheviks as a party bent on seeing every 
aspect of the former tsarist system and Russian capitalism dismantled without delay, Harper 
implicitly compared the Bolsheviks, revolutionaries concerned with social change, with their 
February predecessors, who had been merely concerned with political issues. The party’s 
extremism did not cease when it “set about to confiscate all property,” but also extended to 
penalizing “people who have owned some property.” Surely, Harper reasoned, their radicalism 
would not lead them to “arrest . . . the Cadets.”179 Both symbolically and literally, the Bolsheviks 
threatened to destroy his imagined version of Russia. 
 In the first iteration of what would become a years-long effort to discredit the Bolsheviks 
in the American public’s mind, Harper issued his first widely circulated statements on the party 
only days after they came to power. In the Christian Science Monitor, he labeled the Reds crazed 
extremists who instituted policies directly antithetical to American and Allied war aims. He 
insisted that Trotsky acted on one of his party’s fundamental goals, making secret treaties among 
the Allies available to the public by “giving them out to the world.” Doing so, Harper argued, 
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was comparable to a card game, in which one player (Russia) “throws all the cards on the table.” 
“But when only one side does this, while the opponent [Germany] still holds his hand covered, 
the former is simply a fool and not a bold gambler.” He emphasized that making secret treaties 
public represented a Bolshevik tactic of “bringing about the revolution in Germany, and perhaps 
in France and even America.”180 
 Harper also cast Bolshevik aims as antithetical to American interests by arguing that the 
party sought to demobilize the Russian army, ensuring that Russia and the Allies would loose the 
war. He wrote that “the Bolsheviki destroy the small amount of discipline [in the army] . . . and 
then start in to demobilize.” If the main line of Russian soldiers defending the country’s borders 
disbanded, these soldiers, who the Bolsheviks exposed to antiwar propaganda, would “sweep the 
country clean as they retire in disorder,” thus adding another layer of chaos to an already perilous 
situation.181  
 In short, the Reds’ goals of “revolution . . . stupidity, fanaticism, or whatever you want to 
call it” were “treason to Russia and to her allies.”182 Harper’s Bolsheviks, senseless radicals 
calling for a social revolution in the United States, undermined both Russia and her Allies’ 
chances at victory in the war, and caused general hatred toward capitalism and private property. 
The opposite of the Cadets, the Bolsheviks began to bring Harper’s view of Russia full circle, 
from that of an excited optimist to a bitter foe of Red Russia. 
 
Conclusion 
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 As 1917 ended, neither Harper’s opinion of the February Revolution nor his visceral 
dislike of the Bolsheviks changed. Informed by a perspective that failed to account for 
socialism’s popularity and held Cadet-style liberalism as normative, Harper’s optimism crested 
early in the year and collapsed by the end of it. Even though his view forced him to account for 
the Provisional Government’s failure, he still believed that the October Revolution lacked 
popular legitimacy and that it represented a deviation from Russia’s path toward freedom, not a 
viable alternative to western-style industrial democracy. Most importantly, throughout the year, 
he brought the business community, Washington bureaucrats, and the American public with him 
on this intellectual journey, urging them to imagine Russia in the same way. At a conference of 
the American Historical Association on December 27-29, he presented a paper that analyzed the 
“March Revolution of 1917.”183 He already conceptualized it as Russia’s legitimate revolution 
unlike that of October. His myopic tunnel vision did not end with 1917, however. Over the next 
three years, Harper would gauge political developments in Russia against the February 
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Chapter 3: 
“Bolshevism as a Doctrine is Immoral:” Harper and the Genesis of Soviet-
American Incompatibility 
 
 In June 1918, caricature artist J N Darling sketched a cartoon for the Des Moines 
Register. Entitled “The International Squirrel Cage,” it depicted a rapidly spinning hamster 
wheel labeled “Revolution.” Inside it ran a bear, an ages-old symbol of Russia, furiously 
struggling to keep pace with the wheel’s precipitate speed. On the sidelines stood a short, 
confused, powerless woman labeled “the world” dropping her umbrella while clutching her 
forehead in her trembling hands. Discombobulated, neither the bear nor the lady knew what was 
about to happen, nor could either stop the rapidly unfolding process.184 
 This cartoon exemplifies the political changes afoot in Russia between 1918 and 1921 
and the multitude of international reactions to them. Seven months before, a radical socialist 
party, the Bolsheviks, came to power, replacing the country’s Provisional Government with 
promises to spread socialist revolution worldwide while nationalizing domestic industry and 
giving political power to Russia’s working class. On March 3, 1918, the Bolsheviks signed the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, a peace agreement with the Central Powers that removed Russia from 
WWI and ceded massive amounts of the former Russian empire’s territory, natural resources, 
and population to Germany. A civil war that would last until 1922 erupted as numerous political 
factions fought the Bolsheviks for control of the state. The experience brought the Russian 
populace to the brink of collective exhaustion and ripped apart the country’s social fabric.185 In 
1918, a multinational Allied coalition intervened in Russia in the hopes of undermining 
Bolshevik power and, that year, the Allies backed the White movement, a diverse band of anti-
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Bolshevik forces. Nonetheless, the Bolsheviks’ control solidified until their victory in the early 
1920s. 
 Americans reacted strongly to Bolshevism’s new power. As historian David Engerman 
has shown, their levels of hatred or praise for Russia’s Bolsheviks represented an unprecedented 
turn in Russian-American relations, since they exceeded in depth and quantity American 
resentment for tsarism.186 American’s fear of communism grew, leading to the First Red Scare of 
1919-20, in which government officials hysterically repulsed Bolshevik-inspired domestic 
anarchy and social revolution, targeting those suspected of Red sympathies. Just like the shocked 
elderly lady in Darling’s cartoon, the world stood in uncertainty as it observed the revolutionary 
cauldron brewing. Who were the Bolsheviks? How did the United States relate to Russia’s new 
regime? Could this anticapitalist system morph into the new global standard?  
 This chapter examines Harper’s private and public reactions to the Bolsheviks’ rise to 
power between 1918 and 1921, when he served as a professor at the University of Chicago and a 
Special Assistant in the Department of State’s Russian Bureau. Both positions and the respect he 
garnered from the public allowed him to comment on Bolshevism in ways that placed an 
intellectual straightjacket on the public’s and government’s understanding of it. I argue that by 
measuring the Bolsheviks against a metric that prized democracy and human rights and, 
therefore, held the February Revolution’s aims supreme, Harper helped to define Soviet Russia 
as fundamentally incompatible with the United States’s system of moral values, culture, and 
government. In portraying Red Russia in this way, he concluded that the United States could no 
longer cooperate with it and led the American populace to think similarly. I also contend that two 
factors, Harper’s lack of travel to Russia during the period, and the nature of the sources that he 
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used to justify his preexisting beliefs on Russian politics, accounted for his distorted portrayal of 
Bolshevism. 
 
“Gattling guns, robbery and so forth:” Harper Defines the Bolsheviks 
 Harper had only a vague idea of the Bolsheviks’ tenets and worldview. In fact, in 1919 he 
did not “have a definite conception of just what the theory of Bolshevism is, to say nothing of its 
practices.”187 In this way he was not unique, however, since Americans’ confusion over 
Bolshevism extended to the academy, causing many intellectuals to misunderstand it.188 The 
American mass circulation press profusely discussed the Bolshevik party, particularly in the 
context of the Reds as new players in the Great War, but Americans still tended to resort to 
generalizations about the Russian masses and their collective mindset, instead of attempting to 
understand the Bolsheviks as a political faction with a distinct vision for the country.189 In short, 
Americans read about the Reds as new participants in world affairs and received news of the 
conditions of the Russian populace, yet, especially in the first year following the October 
Revolution, lacked an sense of who the Bolsheviks were and what their practices represented. 
Operating in this atmosphere, Harper missed no opportunity to malign the party and, therefore, to 
set the tone for its reception in the United States. 
Reasoning that the Bolsheviks governed without popular support, Harper argued that this 
Red practice widened the chasm between them and the liberals. Describing Russia’s new rulers 
to an inquisitive high school teacher, he underscored that the word Bolshevik meant “majority,” 
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even though the party “ceased to have a majority in the councils of the [Social Democratic] 
party” before the October Revolution.190 In reality, the name emerged from a 1903 split with the 
Mensheviks at a meeting of the Social Democratic party, in which the Bolsheviks did hold a 
majority. These types of misrepresentations led Harper to claim that the Reds represented a thin 
minority with little support.191 Justifying his assertion, he quoted Lenin saying “in capitalist 
countries, the Communist party can not be a majority in the proletariat. It in fact is the conscious, 
energetic minority.”192 Measured using a yardstick of majoritarian democracy, the Bolsheviks 
failed. 
Harper repeated that the Cadets engaged in a political revolution that overthrew the tsar 
and instituted a new form of government, while the Bolsheviks, in a “confused state of mind–
resting on economic distress and a spirit of vengeance,” carried out a “social revolution, class 
war, under [the] dictatorship of one class–the proletariat.” Because of this, Harper told his 
University of Chicago students, the Reds opposed “industrial democracy as we understand the 
practice.”193 
 He sharply distinguished the Bolsheviks from their historical predecessors, hoping to 
show that the party was un-Russian. Drawing from sources that emphasized Bolshevik plans to 
build “communes” or “cooperative cultivating societies” (to collectivize agriculture and 
substitute collective farms for private ones), Harper told his students that these proposed 
communes had “nothing in common with the old Russian mir,” a collective farming arrangement 
common in imperial Russia that involved peasants in shared farming. Under this system, 
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villagers periodically reallocated land to ensure they farmed equitable portions of it. For Harper, 
this system was an “ownership society,” not, as historian Moshe Lewin argued, a historically 
communal institution that provided the Bolsheviks a collective foundation on which to build.194 
Harper claimed that plans to collectivize agriculture broke with Russia’s history of private 
property, despite the fact that most peasants had a weak conception of what constituted private 
property before the 1906 Stolypin Reforms, which sought to end communal practices and settle 
peasants on private plots of land.  
 Harper also explained the Bolsheviks’ belief in world socialist revolution, which he 
presented as evidence of the party’s fanaticism. “The Bolshevist movement is an international 
one and the revolution in Russia was but the first incident in its progress,” he told the 
Department of State.195 Harper worried after reading Bolshevik statements on the Baku 
Conference of Oppressed Peoples of the East. Held in Azerbaijan in September 1920, the event 
signaled the Soviet state’s commitment to promoting nationalist movements in non-Russian 
territories of the former Russian empire. A response to a call from the Second Conference of 
Moscow’s Third International, an organization formed by Lenin to unite disparate revolutionary 
parties around the world with the common goal of socialist revolution, the Baku Conference 
drew 2,000 people to the city, including socialists from western Europe and the United States. 
The Bolsheviks broadcast news of the event on radio waves that reached Europe, claiming that 
the party stood behind “oppressed workers and peasants” the world over, making the event a 
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critical moment in the history of anti-imperialism.196 In response to news of it, Harper wrote that 
the Bolsheviks gave “a very large per cent age of attention . . . to revolutionary movements 
abroad.” This emphasis indicated that “the Bolos feel more than ever before that their tenure in 
Russia is dependent on their being able to have corresponding movements in other countries.”197 
Even if the Bolsheviks lost power in Russia, Harper remained anxious that they would “go west, 
or east” in order to “continue the great work of saving mankind from the rapacious 
capitalists.”198 He assured Breckenridge Long, the Assistant Secretary of State, that Lenin “still 
entertain[ed] the hope of running the whole world into one Soviet republic and of obliterating all 
frontiers.”199 In Harper’s intellectual universe, one dominated by musings of nationalism and 
essentializations of national character, a political system that promoted internationalism through 
revolution was radical indeed. 
In Harper’s mind, Bolshevism represented destruction. He wrote that “if Bolshevik stands 
for anything it is for conscious, organized loot. There is not one constructive syllable in their 
whole programme.” To build socialism in Russia, Lenin set out to “destroy, as much as possible, 
everything that lies at the basis of the bourjoise order of society . . .  [to] destroy every tangible 
thing possible so the ground will be clear for building up the socialistic regime.”200 When 
compared to the “constructive” forces of the Provisional Government and the zemstvo system, 
the Bolsheviks seemed ruinous.  
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The Russian civil war exemplified the chaos that resulted when Bolshevik class warfare 
and internationalism fused, insisted Harper. He told an audience at the University of Chicago that 
the civil war was a “war of a specific kind, namely, class war, produced deliberately and 
according to a definite program.”201 The conflict had been avoidable. Rather than portraying the 
struggle as a result of competing conceptions of how the revolutionary state would be governed, 
he argued that the Bolsheviks “stirred up class hatreds, preached violent class struggle and then 
started this class revolution.” Furthermore, the Bolsheviks arbitrarily drew these class divisions 
by antagonizing the peasants, pitting the poor against the rich. Harper correctly expressed doubt 
as to whether these classes had firm definitions, since he saw evidence that the description of a 
member of the “poorest peasants” shifted constantly, an occurrence that historians have 
described as pervasive during the early years of Red rule.202 
In defining the Bolsheviks in the first months of 1918 to an expectant audience, Harper 
remained ignorant of some facts, such as that Russian peasants had a historically poor 
understanding of private property, or that the Bolsheviks governed with a measure of popular 
support, but correctly identified others, including the Reds’ commitment to world socialist 
revolution and the evolving definition of classes in the peasant village. Yet the facts that he 
omitted tended to legitimate the Bolsheviks, while those he underscored allowed him to portray 
Bolshevism as a destructive, dogmatic ideology opposed to democracy and forced on the Russian 
populace by a small group of radical socialists. 
 
Bolshevik Cooperation with Germany and the Sisson Documents  
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In WWI, Germany and the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman 
empire) constituted the United States’s enemies. Fighting a two front war, the Germans clashed 
with the Russians in the east and the European Allies in the west. When the Bolsheviks signed 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 1918, its terms negated the Russian threat on Germany’s 
eastern front by surrendering a large portion of formerly Russian territory to it. In doing so, the 
Bolsheviks acted on their ideological antipathy toward Russia’s participation in the war and out 
of necessity to secure domestic support for ending the unpopular conflict. By signing the treaty, 
then, the Reds both fulfilled their promises of peace to the Russian masses and buttressed their 
legitimacy.203 
Harper’s understanding of these events developed in an environment of mass American, 
wartime Germanophobia. During 1918, the United States feared Germans and imagined them as 
enemy saboteurs. School districts across the country banned teaching German language in their 
classrooms. Americans began to refer to German foods, frankfurters and sauerkraut, using a new, 
more Anglicized terminology, hotdogs and liberty cabbage. Teachers and professors regularly 
lost their jobs due to accusations that they shared cultural or financial ties with Germany.204 
Thus, Americans stood primed for and, therefore, susceptible to anti-Germanism. 
Operating in this environment, Harper linked the Bolsheviks to Germany. For him, 
Russia’s negotiations with Germany represented its capitulation to America’s common enemy 
and invited suspicions that the Bolsheviks themselves were German in nature or psychology and 
that they subversively chose to cooperate with Germany. Harper now labeled the party the 
“Bolsheviki Germans.”205 The Reds began “playing the German game,” by taking orders from 
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the Kaiser and accepting funds from the German treasury.206 Already political outliers in 
Harper’s mind because of their emphasis on social revolution, the Bolsheviks were now German 
agents. 
Thinking strategically about the Bolshevik-German relationship was in America’s best 
geopolitical and economic interest, Harper insisted to H E Eames, an Army colonel. “We feel 
that we must keep a hand in Russia, so as not to give [the] Germans a free field,” he noted. 
Reasoning that “we lose the war in the end if Germany gets Russia,” Harper believed that the 
ultimate victory for the Allies was the opportunity to exercise geopolitical influence in Russia 
over the coming decades.207 The “Bolsheviki Germans” could imperil the United States’s chance 
to form economic and diplomatic bonds with Russia after the war, ties that would allow the U.S. 
to sell manufactured goods in the country while extracting cheap raw materials from Siberia.  
In early 1918, Harper believed he had proof of the Bolshevik-Germany relationship. In 
February, Edgar Sisson, a representative of the U.S. Committee on Public Information stationed 
in Petrograd, received a cache of document, most of them in Russian, from Raymond Robins, a 
representative of the American Red Cross in Russia. These so-called “Sisson documents,” if 
authentic, showed that Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev (head of the Communist International), and 
other Bolshevik party leaders received financial assistance from Germany immediately before 
carrying out the October Revolution.208 The documents also dealt with Lenin’s return home from 
Switzerland to Russia in a sealed German railcar in April 1917. 
The National Board of Historical Research, a branch of the American Historical 
Association, asked Harper and J. Franklin Jameson, an historian of colonial and revolutionary 
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America who had no knowledge of Russian language or history, to be the sole members of a 
committee that would scrutinize the documents to determine whether or not they had been 
forged.209 At stake was a potential redefinition of the Bolsheviks based on textual evidence. To 
what degree had the Germans orchestrated the October Revolution in order to weaken the Allies’ 
cause? Did the Germans still support the Bolsheviks? How would Germany’s control of Russia’s 
new government affect future American economic and political interests?  
 As the two studied the documents, Harper took precautions to ensure that he made 
conclusions substantiated by their text. For example, he contacted Sisson to ask for original 
copies.210 He worried over the accuracy of some Russian to English translations that the 
government would publicize in the coming months, noting that he found over seventy-five 
translation errors that could alter the documents’ meaning.211  
Harper and Jameson soon concluded that German and Bolshevik authorities had written 
them. In October 1918, the Committee on Public Information officially published their findings. 
In the final report, the two adhered closely to textual evidence and neither confirmed nor denied 
the link between German financing and the October Revolution that the documents’ validity 
seemed to suggest. They argued that doing so was outside of their purview.212 The only 
conclusion that Harper made was that “by starting a social revolution in Russia, Lenin was 
objectively aiding the enemy from a military point of view.”213 
Even so, Harper was no unbiased judge. Decades later, historian George T. Blakey 
criticized him for conducting the investigation too rapidly and for allowing the Allies’ war aims 
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to color his judgment.214 At the time a socialist newspaper, the New York Call, raised doubts 
about Harper’s ability to examine the documents’ objectively, claiming that he prematurely 
brought his conclusions to the press before he and Jameson issued their final statements under 
government auspices.215 Yet, most importantly, Harper’s understanding of the Bolsheviks was at 
stake. If the documents proved to be forgeries, the Bolsheviks might appear to be legitimate from 
the Allies’ point of view.  
 Despite the report’s lack of conclusiveness, the press took the matter to the extreme, 
surmising that Lenin and Trotsky were German agents whom Berlin paid to carry out a socialist 
revolution in Russia. Opinions in the press that dissented from this view remained few and 
reached a minute readership.216 For example, one article maintained that the Germans used the 
Bolsheviks as a tool to fight the United States: “Proofs removing any doubts that Nicolai Lenine 
and Leon Trotsky, the Bolsheviki leaders, are paid German agents–if indeed any doubts have 
remained–are laid before the world today.” The article’s author wrote that Germany co-opted the 
Bolsheviks to “betray Russia into deserting her allies” and used Harper’s and Jameson’s 
statements to show that “the Bolshevik revolution, which threw Russia into such [an] orgy of 
murder and excesses as the world seldom has seen” had been “arranged by the German general 
staff.” The author added that one document in the published series showed that the Bolsheviks, 
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backed by Germany, sent “agents, agitators, and agent destructors” to the United States and other 
Allied countries through Vladivostok.217 
 Others took a similar line, but claimed that the Bolsheviks’ ideology would allow the 
Germans to overtake Russia. A reporter for the New York Times drew a sharp line between the 
Russian populace’s interests and the Bolshevik-German saboteurs who betrayed them: 
“The present Bolshevist government is not a Russian government at all, but a German  
government, acting solely in the interests of Germany and betraying the Russian people,  
as it betrays Russia’s natural allies, for the benefit of the Imperial German government  
alone. And [the documents] show also that the Bolshevist leaders, for the same German  
imperial ends, have equally betrayed the working classes of Russia whom they pretend to  
represent.”218 
These German agents, Lenin and Trotsky, were responsible for Russia signing the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, “a betrayal of the Russian people.” Moreover, they allowed Germany to infiltrate 
the Russian military, leaving war-time Petrograd open to German invasions from the east.219 
 Other reporters assigned geopolitical significance to Harper and Jameson’s discoveries. A 
correspondent for the Chicago Tribune wrote that the Sisson documents proved that the 
Bolsheviks planned to use Vladivostok as a submarine launching point to spread war to the 
Pacific Ocean and that the Germans ordered their Bolshevik vassals to “furnish information 
regarding the amounts and places of storage of supplies received by Russia from America, 
England, and France.” The Germans used Russia as a launching point for socialist propaganda 
against capitalist nations, including the United States, concluded the commentator.220 
 Harper, too, publicly weighed in on the documents’ implications, but only after the 
government published them. He implied that Lenin and Trotsky did not take money from 
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Germany to use as Berlin decreed, but, instead, were “active” agents who used German financing 
for their own purposes. By doing so, the Bolsheviks tricked the masses into believing in the 
party’s ability to bring positive change long enough not to overthrow them. “All this does not 
excuse Lenine,” Harper wrote “and in fact should condemn him more definitely than if he were a 
mere servant of the German Government.” By accepting German funds, but using them to enable 
the party to rule without mass support, Lenin “helped the German game more effectively than if 
he had been a simple agent.”221 
 Harper also reasoned that the Sisson documents should show the American public that a 
hostile foreign policy toward the Bolsheviks did not mean that “America has declared war on the 
Russian people.”222 Rather, since the Reds were German agents and, therefore, did not serve 
what Harper believed to be Russia’s and America’s best interests, they stood outside the bounds 
of his vision of a Russian nation state. The Bolsheviks epitomized everything that Russia was 
not, he told Americans.  
Yet, decades later, scholar-diplomat George F. Kennan showed that the Sisson documents 
were likely forgeries, in places at least, and identified their author as Anton Martynovich 
Ossendowski, a Petrograd journalist.223 Later work by Helena M. Stone built on Kennan’s to 
give context to accusations against Lenin and argued that Harper and Jameson drew their 
conclusions from an extremely thin evidentiary basis.224 In a recent analysis of telegrams 
exchanged between Germany and the Bolsheviks, historian Semion Lyandres finds no evidence 
that the party received money from Germany either before or during the October Revolution. He 
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even cites archival evidence from the Provisional Government, which shows that even it could 
find no evidence of the Bolsheviks receiving German money at any point.225 
 Thus, when overstated by the press, Harper’s conclusions tended to reinforce the same 
idea he communicated to Richard Crane in 1920–“the utter impossibility of cooperating or 
having dealings with the Bolsheviks.” Of course, Harper based his reasoning on the premise that 
the party had no popular support, despite the fact that, in April 1918, he received word from the 
American consulate in Irkutsk, a city in eastern Siberia, that diplomatic officials there 
“considered the Bolsheviks fully in power” and believed that “the majority of the people in the 
country are for as radical changes as those advocated by the Bolsheviks.”226 Even though 
evidence such as these dispatches suggested otherwise, Harper now believed he had textual proof 
to show that the Bolsheviks ruled illegitimately, and he and the press used it to draw a firm line 
between the Bolsheviks and America’s political system. 
 
Bolshevism, American Business, and the Question of Intervention 
 In the summer of 1918, R C Martens, the head of R. Martens and Company, a firm that 
operated steamships to and from Russia, set about deciphering how his company would function 
in Bolshevik Russia. Martens conducted extensive research on Siberia’s topography, resource 
base, and commercial infrastructure. He sketched detailed agricultural maps of Siberia and 
presented his findings to the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce in New York City, filing 
numerous petitions with the American government (probably the Department of Commerce) to 
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share his knowledge of Russian economic conditions.227 An International Harvester executive 
and the vice chairman of the War Industries Board, Alexander Legge, fretted about business 
ventures that his company planned to launch in Russia just before the October Revolution. His 
main concern was how to “protect the enterprise” from the Bolsheviks, who Legge worried 
might harass the company’s executives, or even seize the operation.228 In response to enquiries 
such as these, the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce convened meetings of 
manufacturing executives to discuss the situation.229  
 Martens and Legge exemplify the conundrum into which Bolshevism placed the 
American business community. What line would the Reds, whom many Americans heard were 
radicals bent on communalizing or nationalizing businesses, take toward foreign corporations 
operating in Russia? Did booming American business have any future in Russia, or should it turn 
its attention elsewhere for open markets? After all, American exports to the country dropped 
from $424,510,459 in mid-1917 to $17,335,518 in 1918, an alarming loss of over $407,174,941, 
or 2448 percent, in a single year.230  
 Harper weighed in on some of these questions, publically depicting the Bolsheviks and 
their program as antithetical to American business interests in Russia and to industrial capitalism 
generally. He was quick to highlight the party’s hostility toward private business by noting that 
“the very base of Bolshevism” rested on “the abolition of private property, and . . . also the 
abolition of private trade.” Citing statements from the Petrograd Soviet, Harper told the 
American public that Bolshevik authorities raided and closed 7,350 Petrograd stores of “a 
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speculative character.”231 A broadscale “destruction of property,” combined with anarchy in the 
Russian provinces, resulted in Bolshevik “seizures and confiscations” of private businesses.232 
How could a regime so ruthless toward private property and free enterprise, basic components of 
capitalism, allow businesses to function unimpeded? 
At this point, an extensive debate raged over how the United States might undermine the 
Bolsheviks. On the one hand, proponents of a more aggressive approach favored armed 
intervention to depose the Reds, while popular sentiment and the United States’s official foreign 
policy took a softer line. For example, the Wilson administration, constrained by the idealistic 
aims of self-determination, its wartime proclamation to make the world “free for democracy,” 
and an isolationist public, resorted to secretive and semisecretive means that needed neither 
Congressional approval nor funding to undermine Bolshevik power. These tactics included 
covert assistance to anti-Bolshevik groups, intelligence gathering in Russia, and material 
assistance to the Russian populace.233 
 In this debate, Harper took the softer line and preferred “economic relief.”234 He took for 
granted that the party was illegitimate and argued that the proper way to oust it was by selling 
Russians the very manufactured goods that the Bolsheviks sought to prevent American firms 
from producing within the country.235 Doing so would bring about a degree of order and sanity, 
believed Harper, that would cause Russians to see clearly the poor decision they had made in 
allowing the Bolsheviks into power: “There will be no political order in Russia until the 
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economic distress is relieved. And to accomplish the latter someone must help Russia get, or 
produce, manufactured articles.”236 Advised by Harper, the American-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce told members that “the thing nearest to the Russian heart is the question of securing 
general merchandise in the form of boots, shoes, socks, underwear.” If American manufacturers 
sold these items in Russia, the Chamber argued, the resulting transactions would “assist in 
bringing about more stable conditions.”237 Believing that this idea deserved wide publicity, 
Harper encouraged an anti-Bolshevik group, the American League to Aid and Cooperate with 
Russia, to organize a nationwide propaganda campaign to show the American populace the 
plan’s merits.238 Rather than directing the business community toward other open markets, then, 
Harper condemned Russia’s existing regime and took for granted that its failure to embrace 
private property and trade numbered among its many shortcomings. 
 Accordingly, Harper never advocated intervention, fearing that Europe might view it as 
antithetical to American war aims.239 He worried that U.S. action would proceed without a plan 
and that, eventually, the number of American troops in Russia would become massive.240 The 
thought of intervention “disturbed” him, unless the mission had a “clear statement of objects” 
that, once accomplished, would force American troops to withdraw from Russia.241 In the 
Christian Science Monitor, Harper urged the public not to use the term “intervention” for fear 
that the Bolsheviks would utilize it in propaganda to depict the Allies as imperialists bent on 
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world domination, thereby validating the party’s message and building its support base.242 
Harper toured several colleges in Kansas and Colorado in February 1918 discussing the line U.S. 
policy toward Russia should take and never mentioned armed intervention.243 
 Of course, providing economic assistance to Russia involved the American business 
community, which would supply raw materials and manufactured goods. In Harper’s view, it 
now had a distinctly anti-Bolshevik role to play. Much like during the tsarist regime’s final 
months when he encouraged businessman to invest freely in the country, Harper still urged them 
to use their economic might to assist Russia, only now for a different reason.  
 
The Shaping of Harper’s Understanding of Bolshevism 
 Between 1918 and 1921, Harper deprived himself of what could have been an 
analytically useful view of Russian political reality by not traveling to the country.244 Tied to his 
University of Chicago office due to teaching responsibilities, he was uncertain of whether he 
would be able to enter Russia in the midst of civil war. Unlike in 1916-17 when frequent visits to 
the country shaped his opinion of its political conditions, his lack of travel afterward forced him 
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to rely heavily on highly biased sources to understand the country. Now taking his cues almost 
entirely from ultra-wealthy Russian businessmen, Cadets, official party decrees, Bolshevik 
newspapers (Pravda and Izvestia), and disgruntled American diplomatic officials who fled 
Russia during the civil war, Harper internalized these sources’ views, which often complemented 
with his own ideological predispositions, and spread them to the public. Thus, ironically, when 
he informed the public and the United States government on Russia’s political situation the most, 
Harper observed on-the-ground Russian conditions least. Therefore, to analyze the sources that 
Harper read and those Russians with whom he spoke is to understand one root of the bias that he 
brought to interpreting Russian during its civil war.  
 On July 22, 1919, the New York Tribune reported on an eccentric Russian staying in New 
York City’s posh Ritz-Carleton, located directly on Central Park. “His name is Batolin,” noted 
the paper “and why he came has not been disclosed.” Writing for the society and culture section, 
the investigating reporter labeled the man “Russia’s John D. Rockefeller.” He preferred to use 
$500 bills to pay for his food and hotel room, and, unlike the average New Yorker, “always gets 
into a taxicab backwards.” Lurking around the Ritz until midnight, the reporter looked for a man 
who “alighted backward from a taxi cab to pay the driver with a $500 bill,” all to no avail. The 
only details that Mr. Michaels, this mysterious Russian man’s spokesman, revealed were that his 
boss had “been in conference with numerous prominent men,” including Colonel Edward M. 
House, Woodrow Wilson’s advisor and a member of the American delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919, among other figures in the Department of State. An enigma, Russia’s 
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Rockefeller was nearly impossible to speak with, primarily because he always lurked inside his 
room, or was out and about in the city.245  
 This man was Petr Prokof’evich Batolin, a wealthy Russian business tycoon.246 Prior to 
1921, Batolin directed the Russo-Asiatic Bank, located in Petrograd with a branch in Shanghai; 
headed Emba Caspian Oil Company, an oil venture searching for crude in western Kazakhstan; 
served as chairman of the Board of Directors of the Petrograd International Loading and Storage 
Warehouse Company; owned the Kama Viatka Trading Company; served as managing director 
of the Ivan Stakhtiev Trading Company; held a membership on the Board of Directors of the 
Russian Bankers, Manufacturers, and Merchants Association of Paris; and was a member of the 
Council of Ship Owners.247 Batolin had a large financial stake in Siberia, the region from which 
many of the dairy products one of his firms exported came.248 According to him, his corporations 
controlled approximately two-thirds of all Russian industry.249 His companies employed some 
800,000 Russians, he claimed. Batolin managed to prevent his workers from going on strike or 
creating disorder, even in 1917 when Russian workers elsewhere did so regularly.250 Though he 
probably exaggerated these figures, Batolin was obviously well connected and wealthy. He 
represented the Russian aristocracy, and had significant financial interests at stake in a new 
Russia whose ruling party took an unfavorable line toward private enterprise.  
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The two met in Petrograd during Harper’s trip to Russia in the summer of 1917 through a 
mutual friend, W. Chapin Huntington, the American commercial attaché to Russian. During their 
first dinner together, Batolin repeatedly apologized that he did not have any vodka to offer to 
Harper and Huntington, leading Harper to phone the American embassy for a half dozen bottles, 
which arrived toward the end of the meal. After dinner, Batolin asked Harper to tell future 
generations of Americans that “things were so upset in Russia in the summer of 1917 that the 
Russians drank their vodka after, instead of before, dinner,” an unimaginable act for a man of 
Batolin’s social prominence. Harper quickly befriended him, realizing that they shared similar 
views on the breakdown of the Provisional Government that summer and the ensuing tide of 
socialist parties.251 
Batolin came to the United States to assist Harper. Worried that his calls for economic 
assistance and his anti-Bolshevism went unheeded in the Department of State and with President 
Wilson, Harper seized the opportunity to use Batolin as leverage to promote his ideas. To 
generate “a little more real understanding of the Russian situation [among] Washington 
officialdom,” Harper needed a man who would be unknown to, yet credible with, the Department 
of State. Batolin fit the bill perfectly. Unfamiliar with the Department of State’s diplomatic 
methods and standard practices, he stated what he believed was the correct line for the United 
States to take toward Russia.252 
 Like Harper, Batolin believed that Bolshevism represented an ugly scar that a small 
group of radicals left on Russia. The best way to soften it, he maintained, was through economic 
assistance, which would empower Russians to overthrow the Bolsheviks, rather than through 
military intervention, which would validate the party’s message of western imperialism. Harper 
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paraded Batolin, who spoke no English, before officials in the United States government and 
corporate circles and translated for him. Batolin spoke with Robert Lansing, the Secretary of 
State; Alexander Legge; Breckenridge Long; William C. Redfield, the Secretary of Commerce; 
and numerous others.253 
 In conversations with these shapers of the United States’s industrial and diplomatic 
policy toward Soviet Russia, Batolin insisted that the Russian masses accepted only liberal 
capitalism as a form of economic and political organization. Bolshevism, did not “create a basis 
for the industrial development of Russia because of the fact of its association with anarchy.” 
“The rabble element of the population of towns and villages” formed the Reds’ main 
constituency, Batolin alleged. This uncultured element of the population never “succeeded in 
creating their own wealth by honorable work” and, therefore, used Bolshevism to “live at the 
expense of the work of others” due to their “laziness and . . . incapacity.” Instead of electing the 
officials who represented their interests, as in a democratic, industrial society, this class resorted 
to anarchy. Despite the Socialist Revolutionaries’ widespread popularity at the time, he 
maintained that the masses did not support moderate Socialist Revolutionary or Menshevik-style 
socialism since neither “differed greatly from Bolshevism.”254 The party represented the polar 
opposite of industriousness, order, and democracy and, therefore, could not possibly enjoy 
popular support. 
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 As a result of what he depicted as the Reds’ hatred of industry and democracy, and due to 
Russia’s inability to overthrow them, Batolin recommended economic assistance as the United 
States’s policy of choice. In a conversation with Breckenridge Long, Batolin observed that 
material aid, such as “three or four ship loads of wheat or rye” delivered to Archangelsk would 
help the Russian masses subsist, while causing Russians to regard Americans “as saints in a 
church; a monument would be erected to them, and the people would turn to them with tears in 
their eyes.” He believed that if America delivered aid, “the political effect . . . would be 3000%,” 
this is, likely to turn the masses against the Bolsheviks who had promised, but failed, to provide 
“bread, land, and peace.”255  
 Harper believed that Batolin’s visit yielded favorable results. Afterward he wrote that 
“the Russian Batolin was a great success. . . . I was told very definitively that he gave the 
impulse to the economic side of our Russian program . . . he made a great hit.”256 Some of 
Batolin’s suggestions found their way into Cyrus McCormick’s September 1918 report to 
Woodrow Wilson.257  
 Even though he claimed to speak for them, Batolin hardly voiced the Russian masses’ 
opinions. Given his business background and interests, and the type of political system most 
favorable to them, he could not judge the Bolsheviks with detachment. After all, had Harper 
spoken with an urban Russian factory worker, a soldier in the Red Army, or others who 
benefitted from Bolshevik power, he would have received a different portrayal of the country’s 
political situation. Harper’s decision to rely on Batolin as a source reinforced a way of 
                                                        
255 Conversation between Batolin and Breckenridge Long, September 7, 1918, Box 5, Folder 21, Harper 
Papers.  
256 Harper to Williams, October 18, 1918, Box 6, Folder 3, Harper Papers.  
257 Harper to House, September 15, 1918, Box 5, Folder 22, Harper Papers.  
 92 
conceptualizing Russian political reality, and the appropriate way for the United States to relate 
to it, that did not always correspond with on-the-ground conditions in Russia. 
 Harper also corresponded with Ariadna Vladimirovna Tyrkova-Williams both before the 
October Revolution and during the civil war. A prominent feminist and Cadet party leader, 
Tyrkova-Williams was born in St. Petersburg in 1869 to wealthy, landowning parents. Later in 
life, she joined the Cadet party, eventually gained membership on its Central Committee, and 
married Harold Williams, a close friend of Harper’s and a New Zealand journalist who reported 
on Russian affairs for papers ranging from London’s Times to the Daily Chronicle. Predisposed 
to see workers’ revolution as menacing and negative, Tyrkova-Williams broke with many of her 
liberal contemporaries by arguing that the Revolution of 1905 represented the climax, rather than 
the beginning of, the liberals’ struggle against the autocracy. Her views fell on the far right wing 
of the party since she argued that a cadre of liberals, not the masses, should govern in the 
populace’s best interests. Highly anti-Bolshevik, she publicly accused Lenin and the Reds of 
using German money to carry out the October Revolution.258 In her 1919 memoirs, a bitter 
diatribe against Bolshevism, Tyrkova-Williams commented that only “intoxicated, simpleminded 
and ignorant working men and peasants” supported the Bolshevik revolution and noted that “the 
Socialists” had made Russia “a tremendous experimental station for their dogmas and 
theories.”259 
 Harper found validation for his opinions in his correspondence with Tyrkova-Williams. 
She often referred to the Bolsheviks as “radical snobs,” or a party that forced its extreme policies 
on the Russian masses. Harper picked up the phrase from her and used it to describe the Reds to 
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others.260 He remained close friends with Harold Williams throughout the period and the two 
shared a flourishing correspondence on Russian events. Tyrkova-Williams, Williams, and Harper 
all agreed on Bolshevism’s fundamentally illegitimate nature and Harper corroborated his 
opinions in part because a native Russian and her journalist husband shared them.261 Taking cues 
from Tyrkova-Williams and repeating her thoughts on the Bolsheviks to others, Harper regularly 
kept her informed of the Wilson administration’s policy toward Russia and assured her that he 
urged the American press to underscore the “terrible experiences through which you have 
passed.”262  
 On March 15, 1919, acting Secretary of State Frank Polk appointed Harper Special 
Assistant in the Department of State’s Russian Bureau, a subdivision of the Bureau of Near 
Eastern Affairs, to conduct an investigation on Bolshevism’s fundamental theories and 
practices.263 In this semibureaucratic consulting position, Harper worked extensively with 
sources from Russia, including official Bolshevik party decrees, speeches by Red leaders, 
Russian newspapers, and written accounts from American diplomats. This job required him to 
translate large volumes of these materials for use by higher-ups and to travel to Washington each 
month to give oral explanations of them.264 In essence, he used these materials to conduct 
“informal classes for the members of the Russian Division on the subject of Soviet 
institutions.”265 
Harper attained this position at roughly the same time that the Department of State began 
to emphasize analysts of Russia’s importance in formulating the United States’s foreign policy 
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toward the country. Their views circulated in various government bureaus and often reached the 
White House, since the issue of how to interact with Red Russia represented a pressing question 
at the time. These analysts worked at the intersection of the academic and policy realms, but their 
interpretations had roots in neither.266  
 Harper launched a search for Bolshevik newspapers, querying journalists, diplomats, and 
others on how he and the department might acquire as many as possible.267 Relying heavily on 
these sources, in turn, meant that Harper’s primary means of understanding a distant society with 
a new form of government was through official party sources and first-hand written accounts, a 
method that he believed to be superior to traveling to Russia, since it avoided the Potemkin 
Village effect to which he feared the Bolsheviks subjected many foreign visitors by showing 
them only the wealthy portions of Russia’s two capital cities, Petrograd and Moscow.268  
 The sources Harper read painted a bleak, sometimes bone-chilling, portrait of the Reds’ 
activities and aims. For example, he analyzed and translated a report of the Extraordinary 
Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Official Crimes (Cheka) from 
Odessa, a city in present-day southern Ukraine.269 The document detailed the cases of fourteen 
men accused of crimes including blackmail, “illegal requisition,” and “belonging to the volunteer 
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army.” The committee freed seven and unceremoniously shot the other seven after brief trials. It 
subjected Tikhon Baranov, one of the accused, to execution by a firing squad after seeing 
evidence that he engaged in “threats and insults to official representations of Soviet 
institutions.”270  
Sources such as these rattled Harper. After translating soviet election results in Pravda, 
he concluded that communist power steadily increased since the paper indicated that the 
Bolsheviks won “an overwhelming victory . . . in Moscow elections.” He feared that this victory 
might promote an even stronger attitude of noncompromise between the Bolsheviks and the 
Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, moderate socialist parties that Harper viewed as 
Russia’s only viable alternative to the Bolsheviks by 1920.271 This profound shift in opinion 
from supporting the right Cadets, who refused to compromise with socialist parties, to 
advocating moderate socialism as a preferable alternative to Bolshevism, stemmed largely from 
the grim picture of the Reds that Harper gleaned from his sources. Drawing conclusions from 
Western European and Soviet newspapers, he believed that Lenin stood on the cusp of igniting 
socialist revolution in Switzerland and elsewhere. Reading Lenin’s words “the Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat in all lands is only a question of time” in a diplomatic dispatch from Stockholm 
led him to this conclusion. Analyzing Severnaia Kommuna, a Soviet newspaper, Harper saw 
evidence that the Bolsheviks launched a war on Russian Orthodoxy, based on an announcement 
that railway authorities removed all icons from train stations.272 
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Not only the information within these sources, but the nature of the sources themselves 
led Harper to perpetuate and exaggerate this notion. Historian Donald J. Raleigh argues that a 
wide chasm existed between the Bolsheviks’ “external language,” which it used for mass 
consumption in newspapers, speeches, and other “official” party mediums, and its “internal 
language,” found in party documents, private reports, and not meant for the public. The former 
masked numerous “internal contradictions and contestations,” replacing them with the façade of 
“coherence and unity” within the party. The Red press bolstered this veneer by using language 
that depicted the Bolsheviks and their enemies as stark opposites: labor versus capital, freedom 
versus slavery, workers versus the bourgeoisie.273 Soviet newspapers overflowed with word of 
world revolution, often reporting on socialism’s inevitable triumph, while omitting local events 
that did not fit its ideologically driven narrative.274 At the same time, however, the party’s 
internal language revealed that provincial Bolsheviks often disagreed with their Moscow 
counterparts on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the former condemning it as a horrific mistake, while 
the latter used external language to portray unanimous Red support for it.275 Members of the 
public frequently wrote to newspaper editors to express their approval or dissatisfaction with the 
publication’s contents but, ultimately, Soviet authorities made the final call on the news items 
made available to readers.276 
Thus reading only external language led Harper to believe that the Bolsheviks were a 
more unified, menacing force than they actually were. Despite the bold claims in these sources, 
Harper read them uncritically, no doubt aware that the Red press featured a distinctly ideological 
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bias that omitted some facts while underscoring others. Yet taking these sources at their word 
both strengthened his arguments against Bolshevism and accentuated the degree to which he 
believed that the party represented the enemy of democracy, capitalism, and liberalism. 
  In July 1919, a harrowing letter from an American diplomatic official who fled civil war 
Ukraine earlier that year came across Harper’s desk. The report, an account of the official and his 
family’s final days in Charkow (modern-day Kharkov, eastern Ukraine), detailed a ghastly site 
its author witnessed, the result of a Bolshevik reaction to “counter-revolutionary” activity, 
known today as the “Red Terror:” 
 Many prominent figures were imprisoned, and quite a number of them are no longer  
 living to tell of the tortures to which they were subjected while in prison. This can only  
 be partly conjectures after viewing the lacerated and disfigured bodies after they were  
 disinterred, many of which I personally inspected on the spot as they were taken out of  
 the huge trenches, which they were compelled to dig, and into which their bodies were  
 afterwards thrown like so many wild beasts. I personally stood by last Sunday morning  
 while 13 bodies were exhumed, amongst them 1 woman and 1 priest, and several officers  
 of the Regular Army, who died for no other reason than that they were "Suspected of  
 Sympathizing with the Volunteer Army," and consequently were Counter  
 Revolutionarists that must be wiped out, if Socialism is to finally come to its own in the  
 world. You can form an idea of the inquisition that these poor martyrs endured, when I  
 tell you that the woman corpse had the right breast cut away; on some bodies hands were  
 missing; on others only fingers were torn out of their sockets; others again were minus a   
 leg, or a foot. I also saw the Skins from 5 hands, including the nails, all of which  
 appeared to have come off the hands after immersion in boiling water, for these ghastly  
 gloves were found in the torture chamber by the public upon entering the basement in  
 which these Champions of the Freed Socialistic Republic [Bolsheviks] held their  
 inhuman Inquisitions. Bodies are being found in various locations in the town, and it is  
 impossible to conjecture how many will yet be unearthed as time goes on; so far as we  
 are able to estimate, some two hundred or more have been recovered, of course many of  
 them quite unrecognizable as [some] are fearfully mutilated, and besides have been too  
 long dead, and are in consequence too much decomposed.277 
 
The account paints the most grim, inhumane portrait of the Bolsheviks possible, while omitting 
other dimensions of the situation. What positive changes had the party brought to the city? What 
was the local populace’s take on the Reds? How did the Bolsheviks govern elsewhere? 
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Moreover, a corresponding “White Terror,” an equally violent, repressive movement that 
featured a diverse band of anti-Bolshevik forces executing Red Army generals in similar ways 
and carrying out systematic terror against Red villages, occurred at the same time.278 Yet the 
report made no mention of it. In an environment in which a lack of technology severely limited 
the ability to communicate rapidly between the United States and Russia, and in which 
knowledge of the realities of Bolshevik rule ran short, Harper believed that such statements 
showed the full picture of Red power. Indeed, in the absence of other sources or seeing 
conditions for himself, he had no choice but to rely on accounts like these. 
 
The Specter of Communism in the United States 
 Because he relied on these sources, Harper feared that radical socialists agitated in the 
United States, bringing the nation to the brink of revolution. Based on a thin margin of evidence 
and heavily driven by his ideological convictions, this tacit acknowledgement that at least a 
modicum of social inequality existed in the United States led him to work closely with the 
Department of State and the Department of Justice to monitor Russians and suspected socialists 
in America and, thus, to draw an even clearer line between Bolshevism and American industrial 
democracy. 
Harper worried about labor discontent in Chicago. He remained ill at ease that worsening 
economic conditions in 1920 and, specifically, the decline in the value of Liberty Bonds, 
government issued promissory notes to help finance the Allied war effort that many workers 
bought into, would leave these laborers discontented and, thus, susceptible to an influx of 
                                                        
278 Viktor G. Bortnevski, “White Administration and White Terror (The Denikin Period),” Russian 
Review 52 (1993): 355.  
 99 
Bolshevik propaganda that he feared infiltrated many Chicago factories. This disgruntlement, 
Harper reasoned, could blossom into full on revolt.279 
Russians who came to the United States after fleeing the civil war in their homeland also 
ranked high on Harper’s list of suspected revolutionaries. In the front of his mind were members 
of Chicago’s “Russian colony,” a group of Russian émigrés living in the city. Harper received 
word of “a man of unusual ability and extreme cleverness, very much like Lenin” who agitated 
Chicago workers. This man, Santeri “Santtu” Nuorteva, was born in Finland in 1881 as 
Alexander Nyberg. A member of the Finnish Social Democratic party, Nuorteva and his family 
fled Finland in 1911 after police threatened to imprison him for criticizing the tsarist 
government. Arriving in the United States in 1912, Nuorteva began to publish numerous socialist 
newspapers and maintained close affiliation with the Socialist Party of America. An organizer of 
workers with extensive contacts in the United States, Finland, and elsewhere, Nuorteva initially 
represented the Finnish Reds but, after their defeat in the Finnish civil war in 1918, became an 
advocate for and representative of Soviet Russia in the United States. He opposed the Allies’ war 
aims and repeatedly agitated against them, landing him on the U.S. Department of Justice’s and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s watch list. Nuorteva eventually came under investigation 
by a United States Senate committee investigating Bolshevism in 1919, fled to Canada, and was 
deported to Russia.280 Harper was concerned about the “rapid expansion” of Nuorteva’s 
“influence in the [Russian] colony,” causing him to put his friends in the business and political 
worlds on alert.281  
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Chicago, one of the United States’s largest and best-known working class cities at the 
time, oversaw several sizeable workers’ strikes and general unrest between 1918 and 1921, 
ensuring that poor labor relations in the city often validated Harper’s view of Bolshevism and 
radical socialism more broadly as upheaval-prone. Historian Robin F. Bachin argues that, in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, Chicago city planners’ efforts to create public venues for 
mass culture and open recreational spaces helped to unite workers and working class immigrants, 
the very groups that Harper feared were most likely to support Bolshevism. In 1919, after a 
number of Chicago factory owners reduced wages during the war despite drastic increases in the 
cost of living, local packinghouse workers went on strike and organized a demonstration that 
demanded the right to form unions. That fall, 90,000 steel workers coordinated a widespread 
protest that called for unionism. During 1919 alone over 250,000 workers went on strike in 
Chicago, leaving the city with one of the highest strike rates in the country. City leaders tended 
to associate these events with Bolshevism and believed that this ideology gave laborers a license 
to revolt.282 The Chicago press regularly delivered news on what it believed to be Bolshevik 
agitation in the city, giving labor incidents a decidedly dramatic, threatening tone, all while 
heftily condemning Bolshevism.283 Eugene Debs, then running on the socialist ticket for 
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president, garnered substantial support in the city and, in 1920, received over one million votes, 
thereby indicating socialism’s local popularity.284  
 Outside of Chicago, too, both Russians and non-Russians suspected of disseminating 
Bolshevik propaganda concerned Harper, prompting his attention to their activities. He kept lists 
of Russian “radicals” detained at Ellis Island, including their often large number of aliases.285 For 
the Department of State, he carefully reviewed Louis C. Fraina’s translation and annotation of 
Lenin and Trotsky’s The Proletarian Revolution. Fraina, a founding member of the American 
Communist Party, was “an able writer, in the same class with Lenin and Trotsky,” remarked 
Harper. Reviewing the book, he believed that it had “probably become the ‘Bible’ of all the 
radical intellectuals of the country” and noted that “Lenin is mighty lucky to have so able a man 
[as Fraina] stationed here in the United States.”286 Informed by official Bolshevik sources, 
Harper assumed that Lenin appointed men such as Fraina and Nuorteva, not that they were 
merely dissatisfied with the state of American social and political organization.  
Albert Rhys Williams, an American journalist who witnessed the October Revolution, 
also made Harper’s list of suspects. Originally a minister, Williams worked in Petrograd as a 
journalist in the summer and fall of 1917 as the Bolsheviks gradually gained power. During this 
time he became a personal friend of Lenin and an ardent supporter of the Bolshevik cause. After 
returning to the United States in 1918, Williams felt ashamed that the Allies had intervened in 
the Russian civil war against the Bolsheviks and, as a result, began a nationwide lecture circuit in 
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which he educated audiences on Russia and called for the United States to withdraw from the 
country. A longtime advocate of socialism who was not content with the American status quo, 
Williams argued that the Sisson documents were forgeries and, therefore, piqued Harper’s 
negative interest. Labeling him simply “another bolsheviki,” Harper resented and dismissed 
Williams’s theory on the documents, claiming that it did not “hand together.”287 
 The American Communist Party did not escape Harper’s gaze, either. Serving the 
Department of State, he monitored the party’s official statements and reported that a Bolshevik 
party congress accepted five of its delegates who “claimed to represent the American working 
class.”288 After reading reports on Americans who attended a meeting of the Third International 
in Moscow, Harper began keeping tabs on John Reed.289 A Harvard graduate and a journalist 
who openly supported socialism, Reed witnessed the Bolshevik revolution firsthand. An admirer 
of the Reds, he traveled extensively in Russia during the civil war years and drifted between 
there and the United States until his death in Russia in October 1920.290 Harper corresponded 
with J. Edgar Hoover, then the Special Assistant to the Attorney General and later head of the 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, on documents that shed light on the United Communist Party of 
America’s and Reed’s activities and whereabouts.291 
 Harper took steps to counter Bolshevism’s influence by engaging in counter propaganda 
and cooperating with government officials to investigate suspect communist sympathizers. For 
example, he worked “to get the facts of the Bolsheviki regime before the public, and particularly 
the workmen.” Hoping to discredit the Reds, he spread negative testimonies to Chicago workers 
from Americans who traveled to Soviet Russia, since he anticipated an approaching 
“unemployment situation” that might disgruntle factory laborers.292 The superintendent of the 
Department of Justice’s Chicago office asked Harper to help investigate a local “confidential 
matter” related to his field of expertise.293 Though no documentation remains in Harper’s papers 
to confirm the consultation’s character, it probably concerned suspect socialists in or around 
Chicago. Harper assisted J. Edgar Hoover in gathering evidence on Ludwig C.A.K. Martens, a 
Russian socialist who claimed to represent the Soviet government in the United States and later 
faced deportation proceedings aimed at preventing him from distributing propaganda on behalf 
of the Bolsheviks.294 The material Harper relayed to Hoover undoubtedly played a major role in 
having Martens deported. 
 Harper’s portrayal of Bolshevism and his investigative work on suspected socialists 
dovetailed with a larger national relationship with radicalism at the time. As labor strife sprang 
up nationwide, authorities tended to blame those suspected of holding socialist sympathies for 
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them.295 This movement’s most memorable manifestation, the First Red Scare, gained steam in 
1919 when A. Mitchell Palmer, the U.S. Attorney General, spearheaded a series of “Palmer 
Raids” in which authorities arrested over four thousand suspected socialists and deported 249 
“conspirators” on accusations of anarchism.296 The sensationalist, “yellow” press covered 
radicalism in America, often casting those who did not support the political status quo as 
“anarchists” or “Reds” bent on overthrowing the system. Mass circulation newspapers 
overdramatized encounters between government officials and suspected extremists, thus echoing 
the authorities’ xenophobic hysteria to readers nationwide. By engaging in Red-baiting, the press 
created an audience eager for future similar news.297  
 Speaking to an expectant public and an alarmed government, Harper and his efforts to 
monitor suspect socialists helped to perpetrate the First Red Scare and, thus, to broaden an 
already wide intellectual, political, and moral chasm between Americans and the Bolshevik 
regime.298 Remembering these years, he admitted that his work had been “of little avail in 
tempering the Red-baiting campaign of Mitchell Palmer.”299 Yet Harper’s toils had a far larger 
effect than he would have willingly admitted. In casting men such as Nuorteva, Williams, and 
Reed as the ultimate “other,” he did the same to the Bolshevik regime, the radical hotbed from 
which he believed all of them emerged. Thus he gave intellectual and political justifications to 
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the authorities who directed America’s first knee-jerk reaction to communism, and to an 
expectant populace that followed suit. 
 
No Room for Compromise: Recognition of Soviets versus Recognition of 
Bolsheviks 
 
 In early February 1919, the Senate Judiciary Committee subpoenaed Harper to testify on 
the methods and effectiveness of Bolshevik propaganda in the United States and political 
conditions in Russia in a hearing to take place between February 11 and March 10.300 The 
committee prized Harper’s expertise on Russian conditions, claiming that he would serve as a 
“lead witness” in the proceedings.301  
 At this hearing, Senator Lee Slater Overman, a Democrat from North Carolina, 
questioned Harper on the soviets’ composition: “Is the soviet part of the Bolshevik government? 
Is it one and the same thing?”302 Harper responded bluntly: “In my opinion, it is one and the 
same thing.” He then explained that even though the soviets began as democratic bodies that 
expressed the popular will, the Bolsheviks overtook them and perverted their nature: 
 “The parallel is often drawn that the soviets are like a parliament of a western country,  
 while the Bolsheviki are simply the majority party in that parliament. But inasmuch as  
 the idea of turning over to the soviets all power of organizing the country on this soviet  
 basis is the Bolshevik idea, opposing the idea of the other socialists’ parties, and, of  
 course, of the bourgeois parties [is too]. In actual fact I do not see what distinction can be  
 made between the Bolsheviki and the soviets.” 
He then explained that the Bolsheviks “definitely expelled from the soviet . . . the right socialist 
revolutionaries and . . . the Mensheviki Social Democrats,” justifying their actions by claiming 
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that “the two groups were counter-revolutionists and were working against the soviets, and their 
presence therefore could not be tolerated.” Yet Harper and the Bolsheviks gauged who 
constituted a “counter-revolutionist” by vastly different definitions. According to the Reds, he 
argued, a counterrevolutionary was a person who acted “counter to a revolution of the Bolshevist 
brand, not the revolution of March, 1917.”303 In his mind, however, the Bolsheviks were 
counterrevolutionaries since they subverted the February Revolution’s principal aims. Judging 
the party against the February Revolution, it once again came up short. 
 Harper’s testimony exemplifies a larger intellectual and political conundrum in which he 
and American policy makers found themselves in the early years of Bolshevik rule: how to 
navigate the complex problem of official recognition. The question turned on whether the 
Bolsheviks had become synonymous with the soviets or, in other words, whether or not they had 
expelled other parties from the bodies to such a degree that the Reds constituted almost all of 
their membership. If this were not the case, the government could recognize the soviets, 
democratic bodies with freely elected parties, and, in doing so, undermine Bolshevik power 
while continuing the United States’s relationship with Russia. If it were true, the government 
could recognize neither the Bolsheviks nor the soviets, both permanent governing institutions, 
effectively severing diplomatic ties with the country. The latter option meant that the United 
States would have no formal relations with Red Russia. 
Beginning in 1918, Harper debated the question of which, if any, body the United States 
should recognize. His 1919 response to the Senate represents the final product of his internal 
deliberation. In January 1918, he could not fathom how he or the government could recognize 
the Bolsheviks. If the United States did communicate with them, it should do so only to “try to 
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outwit them.”304 He held that “getting into touch with the Soviets,” which did not “necessarily 
mean recognizing the Bolsheviki” was “more imperative than ever.” “Communication with the 
Soviets is not communication with one party, the Bolsheviki,” Harper wrote. “It seems to me that 
. . . one can make a sharper distinction between Bolsheviki and Soviet.”305 Attempting to spread 
his opinions to influential journalists, Harper corresponded with Walter Lippmann, America’s 
most political connected journalist at the time and himself a follower of Russian events. Harper 
told him that the soviets were brainchildren of the February Revolution. They “are going to be 
permanent institutions . . . they are the only authority over there,” he wrote. Bolsheviks made up 
only a small percentage of their membership, he believed.306 
 By that summer, Harper modified his opinion to account for a clear increase in Red 
power. “The Soviet idea was a good idea, one of the big contributions of [the February] 
Revolution,” he wrote.307 Yet he told the reading public that the soviets, organs through which 
“workmen, peasants and soldiers . . . raised their voices [during] the first months of the 
Revolution,” fell pray to Bolshevik trickery in early 1918. He told readers that even though he 
lacked accurate data on the bodies’ composition, and that their membership varied widely, non-
Bolshevik Russians did not accept the idea of a state in which all political power rested with the 
soviets. In other words, even though the masses voiced their political preferences by backing the 
February Revolution and the soviet idea, now that the Bolsheviks had power in them, the 
populace no longer agreed with the bodies’ decisions. Since the soviets ceased to be “strong 
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organizations of the broader masses of the people,” (read, came under Bolshevik influence), 
Russia turned its back on them. Recognizing the soviets would be dangerous since doing so 
might legitimate an “undemocratic” party perverting a fundamentally democratic institution.308 
 By the fall of 1918, Harper’s line of reasoning reached its logical conclusion–that the 
Bolsheviks undemocratically dominated the soviets, which represented nothing more than 
“tyranny and suffering.” The Reds changed the soviet from “its original function . . . an agent of 
national co-operation” to “something to be used by them as an instrument of class war.” 
Accordingly, he told the public, a system “opposed to the fundamental principle of Russian life,” 
a government bent on “a doctrine of class war which is not only opposed to our own views and 
principles, but also to those of the Russian people” ruled the country.309  
 As a result, Harper believed that diplomatic relations with Russia were impossible, since 
recognizing it in any form would imply cooperation with the Bolsheviks. “Any recognition of the 
Soviets is a recognition of the Bolsheviki,” he wrote.310 Doing so would approve of the “present 
tyranny” in which the Bolsheviks used the soviets to engage. Economic relations, too, could send 
a similar message, leading Harper to state in 1921 that the United States should cut off all 
economic ties with Soviet Russia, halting trade with and aid to the country.311 Unlike David 
Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister from 1916-22 who reopened economic relations with 
Soviet Russia in 1920 because he believed that Europe needed wheat and other food supplies 
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from the country despite its politics, Harper argued that America’s stance should not support the 
Bolsheviks in any way, even through mutually beneficial trade.312  
 
The Failure of U.S.-Soviet Cooperation 
 In 1920, a chart showing the differences between the Soviet and American governments 
circulated among members of the Department of State’s Russian Bureau. It consisted of two 
side-by-side diagrams depicting the source of political power in each system and noted that 
Americans “directly ELECT” their leaders, yet made no such statement about the Soviet 
regime.313 Focusing on the two governments’ differences, the chart exemplifies why Harper 
believed no cooperation with Soviet Russia was possible–the two countries’ systems of 
government were simply incompatible. The Bolsheviks adhered to a dogma so different from 
that which Harper believed America practiced that, in his view, cooperation with the country was 
irresponsible, immoral, and patently dangerous to the United States. 
 The first plank of this dogmatic Bolshevik code was an absolute unwillingness to 
compromise on any portion of their program. No true Bolshevik, Harper reasoned, could engage 
in “genuine compromise,” since they did so only for “sheer expediency.” This hardline stance 
became so embedded in the party’s program that any person who wavered from it was no longer 
a Bolshevik: “it ceases to be Bolshevism.” “This fact itself would seem to preclude the 
possibility of compromising with them,” Harper told his University of Chicago history class in 
1919.314 
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 In his view, the Bolsheviks also lived by foreign moral conventions. “These fanatics are 
not bound by the same code that normal men observe,” wrote Harper. An unwillingness to abide 
by agreements or treaties comprised a unique but dangerous component of their worldview. 
Harper told Christian Science Monitor readers that Trotsky agreed to cooperate with the Allies in 
late 1917 by not removing Russia from the war, yet, in March of the following year, signed the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which did exactly that.315 He reasoned that after signing the treaty, the 
Bolsheviks agreed to stop agitating for socialist revolution in Germany. Yet the party “gladly 
entered upon” the treaty with the intention of disobeying it afterward, which it soon did.316 In 
reality, in the late fall of 1917, Trotsky had no intention of withdrawing Russia from the war, but 
subsequent intraparty debates that Trotsky lost and Lenin won ensured that Russia would exit the 
conflict, not that Trotsky deliberately lied and planned to renege on his word all along. 
Observing from his vantage point, Harper worried that the Reds would not honor any agreement 
that the United States signed with them. The party did not believe in “political democracy,” after 
all.  
 Harper also came to believe that Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership aimed to wage war 
directly on American capitalism and democracy. Quoting Lenin saying that he was “counting on 
the inevitability of the International revolution,” and Zinoviev saying that “the stage of verbal 
propaganda and agitation has been left behind . . . the time for decisive battles has arrived,” 
Harper wrote a report for the Department of State in which he insisted that these statements 
“show conclusively the direct attack made upon the Government of the United States by the 
                                                        
315 “No Cooperation with Bolsheviki: Such a Contingency Declared to be Impossible,” Christian Science 
Monitor, July 9, 1918, 6.  
316 “Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia: Character of Bolshevist 
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Bolsheviks.”317 For these reasons, having “any dealing[s] with the Bolsheviks” was “utterly 
immoral, and dangerous” for the United States.318 
 In late 1919 the Department of State’s Russian Bureau assembled all of Harper’s official 
translation and analysis work to date and reprinted it as a government sponsored pamphlet. This 
“Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia” was, in many ways, 
Harper’s crowning achievement in propagating his anti-Bolshevik interpretation of Russian 
politics within the Department of State and to the public. In this document, which contained 
extensive translations of Bolshevik newspapers and telegrams accompanied by Harper’s 
commentary, he took a similar stance to his portrayal of the Bolsheviks elsewhere, but 
amalgamated his disparate statements on the Reds into one succinct formulation: 
 “This study which has been made of the Bolshevist movement . . . shows conclusively  
 that the purpose of the Bolsheviks is to subvert the existing principles of government and  
 society the world over, including those countries in which democratic institutions are  
 already established. They have built up a political machine which, by the concentration of  
 power in the hands of a few and the ruthlessness of its methods, suggests the Asiatic  
 despotism of the early Tsars. The results of their exercise of power . . . have been  
 demoralization, civil war, and economic collapse.”319 
 
Unlike Russia’s post-1905 and post-February systems of government, both of which Harper 
believed carried the promise of a liberal, democratic Russia open to free trade and participation 
in the Allied cause in WWI, the Bolsheviks ruled in a way entirely contradictory to these 
standards. In fact, they did so to such a degree that their methods more closely resembled the 
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 In 1921, Harper heaped praise on a report to the Department of State solely because of 
the “clear distinction” it drew between “the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevist coup 
d’etat.”320 Still unwilling to view Russia through any lens except that colored by the February 
Revolution and the promises of liberalism and electoral democracy, Harper failed to see and, 
therefore, to depict, a portrait of Bolshevik power between 1918 and 1921 that accounted for all 
aspects of the party’s program and on-the-ground actions. Blinded to facets of the Russian 
situation that tended to show popular support for the Reds or logical reasoning behind their 
actions, yet keenly aware of the party’s defects, missteps, and hyperbolic claims of internal unity 
and international socialist revolution, Harper found in Russia a fertile field for his liberally 
oriented biases. His individual predilections, combined with limited access to representative 
sources of Russian political reality and his uncritical reading of them, gave Harper evidence to 
support this interpretation. Attempting to educate a populace that knew little about Bolshevism, 
he then transferred his subjectivities onto various strata of American society, including 
newspaper readers, businessmen, government bureaucrats, and members of Congress.  
 Nonetheless, he correctly realized that, by 1921, the Bolsheviks held power. With this in 
mind, he wrote that he was all for “hands off Russia.”321 In other words, the United States, 
colored by his dogmatically anti-Bolshevik interpretation of post-1917 Russian politics, should 
back away from Russia, a country with which it was now totally incompatible, leaving it 
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unrecognized. Though Harper’s voice was far from the only one calling for nonrecognition of the 
Soviet regime, his was certainly one of the most informed and influential, not least because he 
could claim that it benefitted from years of traveling in and studying Russia, and because it 
reached the American populace and influential business and political figures at a crucial moment 
in U.S.-Russia relations. In the end, of course, the Wilson administration did not recognize Red 
Russia and neither did subsequent Republican governments, including that of Warren Harding, 
Calvin Coolidge, or Herbert Hoover. Only in 1933, in the wake of the Great Depression, did 
American businessmen successfully pressure Washington and the Roosevelt administration to 
















 Torn over how to conclude my thesis, I met with my advisor, Donald J. Raleigh. His first 
question to me was “Well, Griffin, tell me whether or not you like Harper.” Without much 
forethought, I responded with a firm, certain, and visceral “no!” Citing the reasons for my 
answer, I argued that Harper misrepresented Russia and refused to view the country’s 
development through any lens other than his own. Projecting a democratic future for Russia in 
1916 and the first half of 1917 based on a perspective that held democracy, capitalism, and free 
trade as normative, he became disillusioned when the Bolsheviks came to power in October. He 
trumpeted his claims to an expectant American public, encouraging Americans to understand 
Russia as he did. In short, I insisted that I disliked Harper primarily because I thought that his 
interpretation of Russia and its revolution revealed as much about him as it did about the country 
he claimed to know so well. 
 Yet I, like Harper, am a subjective observer. With coursework on Russian history, and 
access to a century of historical scholarship that has grappled with the same questions that 
Harper sought to answer, I understand Russia’s past differently than he did. Hindsight is always 
twenty-twenty. My own subjectivities, the unique, culturally-informed, constantly evolving 
values that account for my views of the past and present, have led me to understand the Russian 
Revolution as a justified series of events driven by popular opinion that followed a logical, 
legitimate political course. Therefore, my proclivities have also come to bear on my portrayal of 
Harper. Thus, in reflecting upon why I do not “like” Harper, I became aware of my own biases 
and remembered that, at the time, Harper’s claims would have seemed highly plausible to an 
audience that had far less access to knowledge about Russia than students today. The differences 
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in my perception and Harper’s, then, are not surprising since each of us formulated them at 
radically different moments in history. Like my own, Harper’s views can be historicized. 
 In this study, I set out to restore Harper to the historical record and to situate his 
understanding of Russia at a particular historical juncture–the Russian Revolution. I argue that he 
staked a powerful and widely respected interpretive claim to revolutionary Russia’s political 
trajectory that adapted to changing circumstances in Russia and the United States, thus reflecting 
the environment in which he operated. In chapter 1, I contend that, in 1916, Harper contributed 
heavily to an ongoing conversation on economic opportunity in Russia, reassuring businessmen 
and investors that the country was business friendly and that it stood on the threshold of 
developing a democratic political and economic system that would make it more so. As 
America’s Russian expert, Harper especially weighed in on business opportunities in the country, 
not least because, as American business thrived and searched for new markets, the prism of 
economic possibilities represented one of the primary ways in which Americans understood 
Russia. Well-connected in the business world, Harper had access to those for whom his pro-
business views mattered. In chapter 2, I demonstrate that Harper saw the events of 1917 through 
a Cadet-oriented perspective that caused him to praise the February Revolution and condemn its 
October counterpart. Forced to explain to Washington, businessmen, and the public Russia’s 
gradual disillusionment with the post-February system and its resulting tumult, he attempted to 
use his inflexible perspective, which could account only for democratic, capitalistic 
development, not social revolution, to do so. As an American with a university professorship and 
a privileged social position, he could hardly have taken an opposing view at the time, since doing 
so would have meant supporting a party and a revolution that withdrew Russia from WWI and 
the commitment it had made to its Allies, while condemning a revolution that did the opposite. In 
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chapter 3, I show that Harper gauged the Russian civil war and the early years of Bolshevik 
power by the February Revolution’s standards. Constantly failing to meet his expectations, the 
Bolsheviks received a negative portrayal from him. Though already predisposed to react 
unfavorably to the Reds due to his previous vision for Russia, Harper took his information during 
this period mainly from wealthy Russians, Cadet party members, Bolshevik newspapers, and 
American observers. Yet, writing and speaking in an environment of rabid anticommunism, 
taking any view other than the one he did would have likened Harper to John Reed, Eugene V. 
Debs, or Albert Rhys Williams, all of whom remained on the political establishment’s fringe and 
were the objects of authorities’ antiradical, Red Scare driven, suspicions. Ultimately, I conclude, 
Harper’s portrayal of Russia between 1916 and 1921 constructed a binary that, both in his mind 
and in public opinion, pitted the United States against Soviet Russia.  
 In short, I have attempted to place Harper’s views in conversation with a cohort of 
Americans that comprised businessmen, the reading public, Washington politicians and 
bureaucrats, students, and scholars. In doing so, I have shown that, as a filter through which 
information on Russia passed before reaching the public, Harper molded public opinion on the 
country during its years of revolution. Adding to knowledge on how the Russian Revolution 
shaped world history, I have attempted to demonstrate that the event received a portrayal abroad 
that reflected the unique subjectivities of figures like Harper and the sources from which they 
took their information. 
 Even decades after the revolution, Harper’s claims and the scholarship they nurtured had 
profound legacies. As an academic authority at a renowned university, he taught and advised a 
number of students, some of whom went on to prominent scholarly careers. For example, 
comments and correspondence between Harper and two of his students in particular suggest that 
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some of his advisees mirrored his understanding of Soviet Russia in their graduate work and, in 
turn, carried a broadly similar mindset forward into their scholarship in subsequent decades. 
 Harold Lasswell, a PhD student advised by Harper in the early 1920s, wrote a paper on a 
“world-wide conflict, this struggle between communism and capitalism.” He believed that the 
world faced “a choice between two systems . . . [Soviet] communism and capitalism.”322 Vernon 
Van Dyke, another of Harper’s advisees, wrote a master’s thesis on Soviet propaganda about 
America in 1934. In it, he argued that, even though governments had a “responsibility . . . to 
refrain from spreading propaganda hostile to foreign governments,” the Soviet Union continued 
to do so, leveling its sights on Washington.323 Indeed, neither paper received any criticism from 
Harper, indicating that he approved of the papers’ claims, thereby laying the foundation of 
legitimacy for Lasswell’s and Van Dyke’s interpretations.324  
 Both students went on to become well known academics: Lasswell was appointed 
professor of law at Yale University and president of the American Political Science Association 
before his death in 1978, and Van Dyke taught international relations at the University of 
Manchester, DePauw University, the University of Iowa, Yale University, Reed College, and the 
University of California at Berkeley until his death in 1998. Because Harper lent intellectual 
authority to both scholars’ claims early on, their ideas persisted, allowing them to resurface in 
different political contexts. For example, in his now classic work on political psychology, 
Propaganda Techniques in World War I, Lasswell portrayed the Reds negatively by referring to 
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them as the “ruthless Bolsheviks.” Like countless others, Lasswell understood the Bolsheviks as 
a foil to democratic America and argued that their lack of patriotism, when compared to 
American wartime camaraderie, fell short, and led to Russia’s “defection” from its commitment 
to the Allies during WWI. Van Dyke also continued to present relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union as inherently at odds. In 1970, he insisted that Moscow controlled 
the content of mass media to maintain its power, unlike the United States, which allowed its 
public free flow of information necessary to promote the democratic process.325 Elsewhere he 
wrote that the Bolshevik party promised democracy only “in order to destroy democratic, liberal 
values” and replaced them with “an authoritarian, totalitarian regime” with which the United 
States could not cooperate.326 
 Although Lasswell’s and Van Dyke’s claims were similar to numerous others articulated 
at the same time, Harper had provided the implicit intellectual approval necessary to allow them 
to do so and, therefore, to engage in what political scientist Matthew Hirshberg calls 
“perpetuating patriotic perceptions,” the practice of shaping public opinion and discourse during 
the Cold War, an imagined ideological battle between capitalism and communism, in a way that 
entrenched differences, rather than similarities, between the two superpowers.327  
Harper’s voice spread far beyond the academy, reaching Washington bureaucrats, 
business professionals, and the American populace at large. Though few records remain of how 
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the thousands of Americans who heard Harper’s talks, read his writings, or spoke to him about a 
business deal in Russia received them, the Cold War turned on a logic remarkably similar to 
Harper’s: antagonism between two countries with incompatible political systems. Perpetuated in 
large part by public opinion, it represented the result of optimistic, democratic expectations for 
Russia that failed to align with the country’s course during the six decades following the October 
Revolution.328 Herein lies one of Harper’s unintentional, yet defining, contributions to American 
conceptions of Soviet Russia, a world superpower that would dominate the international political 
scene until its demise in 1991. Though Harper’s was not the only voice that stressed this 
interpretation, it was one of the most influential and, therefore, held considerable sway over the 
national psyche.  
Harper’s experience, then, illuminates several important themes in the realm of public 
opinion and academia. Public intellectuals, those who are both scholars and popular 
commentators, help to define the way in which a society understands current intellectual and 
political issues. Therefore, their biases take on an especially important role. In Harper’s case, 
classifying his interpretation of Russia as “right” or “wrong” underestimates its complexity. 
After all, some agreed with it, both at the time and today.329 The critical question here is: what if 
it was wrong? Indeed, as experience has shown, figures such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Carter 
Administration’s National Security Advisor, and Richard Pipes, a Harvard historian and foreign 
policy advisor to Ronald Reagan, both of whom held starkly anti-Soviet views, can shape the 
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course of international relations. Building influence within the White House, both convinced 
Washington to take a noncompromising stance toward the Soviet Union.330 Conversely, Henry 
Kissinger, a Harvard academic of a different worldview and the Secretary of State in the Nixon 
and Ford administrations, bolstered the policy of détente, a relaxation of tensions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, due to his intellectual clout.331  
Thus, accounting for public intellectuals’ political predilections remains of the utmost 
importance. After all, just like Harper, shapers of public opinion today articulate their thoughts in 
a particular cultural and political environment that both constrains and enables their 
understandings. Accounting for these positionalities holds special relevance in the twenty-first 
century, in which we are bombarded by a constant flow of instant information, readily available 
to anyone with access to a television, computer, or smartphone.  
Finally, Harper’s experience helps to demarcate the limits of knowing more generally. 
Indeed, his take on Russia stemmed in large part from his familiarity with Russians who were 
like him and not the unscrubbed masses. Those seeking to understand other societies through 
similar means face a temptation to stake a claim to broader knowledge that might overstate their 
case. Therefore, understanding one’s own subjectivities and those of one’s sources remains 
paramount in tempering avowals to indisputable knowledge. 
Over the last decade, Russia has witnessed the rise of Putinism, and commentators now 
speak of a “new Cold War” that is said to stem from tensions between Russia and the West over 
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and military activity in eastern Ukraine. One can only hope 
that, as the country continues to be the subject of journalists’, academics’, and public 
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intellectuals’ interests, they will attempt to understand and observe, not imagine, Russia, 
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Samuel Northrup Harper (1882-1943), circa mid-1930s.  














American Exports to Russia, 1915-1921 
 
 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 
European 
Russia 
$125,794,954 $309,806,581 $315,250,020 $8,902,449 $30,259,745 $15,446,832 $14,187,850 
Asian 
Russia 
$44,198,950 $160,701,673 $109,260,439 $8,433,069 $52,176,440 $13,280,886 $1,113,313 
Total $169,993,904 $470,508,254 $424,510,459 $17,335,518 $82,436,185 $28,727,718 $15,301,613 
 
For 1915 data, see Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Calendar Year 
1919, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1920), xii-xiii. For 1916 data, see Foreign Commerce and 
Navigation of the United States for the Calendar Year 1920, Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), x-xi. For 
1917-21 data, see Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Calendar Year 
1921, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (Washington: 

































Harper’s photograph of rural Russia from a trip, probably taken around 1913. Note the contrast 
between the traditional Russian Orthodox Church, the peasant woman watering the cow in the 
stream, and the power lines in the foreground and distant background.  




















Harper’s photograph of a Russian peasant, circa 1915.  
Source: Samuel N. Harper Russian Pamphlet Collection, Special Collections Rare Book Archive, 





“The International Squirrel Cage,” June 29, 1918.  
Source: Box 7, J.N. “Ding” Darling Papers, University of Iowa Special Collections and 









Petr Prokof’evich Batolin (right), circa 1914, Moscow. 
Source: Delovaya elita rossii, Rossiyskaya Portretnaya Galereya, http://all-
photo.ru/portret/index.ru.html?kk=202653c2eb&filter=&glr=5x5&go=Ok.  
 
 
